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Corporate Hostility to Arbitration 
Richard Frankel 
In the last thirty years, corporations have aggressively and 
successfully pushed the Supreme Court to invalidate virtually all state 
regulation of mandatory arbitration clauses on the ground that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts any state law that expresses “hostility” to 
arbitration.  Under current doctrine, the FAA preempts any state law that 
treats arbitration clauses less favorably than other contracts, or that is 
premised on the idea that arbitration is inferior to litigation for resolving 
disputes. 
Yet, at the same time corporations decry state-law hostility to 
arbitration, they frequently express their own hostility to arbitration in the 
way they draft their arbitration provisions.  By carving out specific claims 
from arbitration, adopting procedural rules that approximate litigation, or 
imposing restraints that make it difficult for their consumers and employees 
to bring disputes in arbitration, corporations have shown that they believe 
arbitration to be inferior to litigation in multiple ways. 
Although scholars have widely debated the Supreme Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence, “corporate hostility” to arbitration has gone 
largely unnoticed.  This article examines the various methods by which 
corporations express hostility to arbitration and argues that this hostility 
carries significant implications for FAA preemption doctrine.  Currently, 
contract drafters can exempt claims from arbitration because they believe 
that arbitration is inferior to litigation.  But when states seek to regulate 
arbitration for those same reasons, they are barred from doing so by the 
FAA.  Thus, corporations can exempt claims from arbitration to maximize 
their self-interest, but states cannot exempt claims from arbitration to 
protect the public interest. 
This dichotomy is anti-democratic and results in bad policy.  This 
article proposes that corporate hostility to arbitration demonstrates that 
not all hostility to arbitration is improper and that states should have 
greater freedom to regulate arbitration clauses without violating the FAA. 
 
 Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law.  I would 
like to thank the participants in the Rutgers Law School Center for Corporate Law and 
Governance Workshop for their thoughtful suggestions and feedback. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the debate surrounding the fairness of mandatory arbitration 
clauses centers around the question of how widely the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) preempts state law.  That is because many efforts to regulate the 
arbitration process, or to police the perceived abuses of arbitration, come 
from state legislatures or from judges who strike down arbitration clauses 
when they violate state law or public policy.1 
Yet, most attempts by states to protect their citizens from being forced 
to submit all disputes with employers or businesses to binding arbitration 
run headlong into the FAA.  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Congress enacted the FAA in order “to reverse the longstanding judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements” that existed in English common law and 
to place arbitration clauses on “the same footing” as other contracts.2  As a 
result, the Act preempts any state law principle, “whether of legislative or 
 
 1  See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption of State Public-Policy 
Based Employment Arbitration Doctrine: An Autopsy and an Argument for Federal Agency 
Oversight, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (stating that since the mid-1980s, “state 
legislatures and courts have forcefully sought in a vast array of contexts to regulate and, 
indeed, to invalidate arbitration agreements that the legislatures or the courts have perceived 
as threatening the interests of the state, its businesses, its consumers, or its workers”).   
 2  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
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judicial origin”—that directly regulates arbitration clauses, that declares a 
particular type of dispute non-arbitrable, or that makes arbitration clauses 
enforceable only if they meet certain minimum fairness standards—on the 
ground that it singles out arbitration clauses for differential treatment and 
thus is hostile to arbitration.3 
Wielding this doctrine, corporations and other proponents of 
mandatory arbitration have aggressively pushed the courts, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court in particular, to strike down as preempted any state law that 
regulates arbitration or that seeks to police the most abusive uses of 
mandatory arbitration.4  In recent years, arbitration proponents and 
corporate entities have convinced the Court to expand the reach of FAA 
preemption, asserting a Lochnerian5 view that the FAA entrenches a rigid 
principle of freedom of contract and that it immunizes arbitration clauses 
from virtually any effort to make arbitration fairer, or to invalidate 
arbitration when it becomes unfair.6  Corporate organizations including the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce have taken the position that arbitration clauses 
 
 3  Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).  This view that the FAA was 
intended have such a profound effect has been widely criticized.  See infra notes 20–22 and 
accompanying text. 
 4  For example, some state legislatures have outlawed mandatory arbitration of 
personal injury claims, employment-related claims, or insurance claims.  Sarah Rudolph 
Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 759, 785–87 (2001).  Similarly, some state courts have adopted rules prohibiting 
mandatory arbitration of certain claims.  See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 
565 U.S. 530 (2012) (discussing and striking-down ruling of the West Virginia Supreme 
Court establishing that wrongful death and personal injury claims against nursing homes 
could not be subject to mandatory arbitration); Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 
P.2d 67 (1999) (holding that claims for injunctive relief could not be subject to mandatory 
arbitration).  
 5  The high point in the Supreme Court’s elevation of contractual freedom to override 
laws that promote the health and welfare of citizens is exemplified the famous case of 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905), in which the Court struck down a state 
regulation limiting the working hours of bakers as violating Due Process protections for 
freedom of contract.  See Matthew J. Kolodoski & Candace M. Groth, The Future of 
Collective Employment Arbitration Part II: Apocalyptic Warnings, Lochnerizing, and the 
Right to Contract., 24 TEX. J. ON CL & CR. 1, 3 (2018) (speculating about whether the 
Supreme Court has essentially imposed a Lochnerian freedom of contract regime in its 
arbitration jurisprudence).  
 6  See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-
A-Center, Concepcion, and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
323, 325–26 (2011) (stating that repeated Supreme Court decisions from the last two 
decades has “vastly expand[ed] the power of companies to impose and control arbitration 
procedures while tying the hands of state legislatures and courts”).  Corporate organizations 
and organizations that litigate on behalf of corporate interests have advanced this position to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Brief for Pac. Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 11, Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 573 U.S. 904 (2014) (No. 
13-856) (arguing the FAA enshrines a policy “in favor of contractual freedom” and 
asserting that “[t]he freedom to make and enforce contracts reflects a fundamental element 
of free choice that must be protected” by the FAA). 
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must be enforced according to their terms.  In their view, this means that 
any state principle that would place limits on how a corporation (or any 
party) can draft its arbitration clause reflects the same “judicial hostility” to 
arbitration that the FAA was designed to abolish.7 
Companies have good reason to aggressively expand FAA 
preemption.  Arbitration clauses are largely drafted by corporations.  
Mandatory arbitration provisions are often included in non-negotiable, 
take-it-or-leave it adhesion contracts in a variety of settings, including 
employment agreements, consumer contracts, lending and financial 
services, and car purchases.8  Consumers and employees have little choice 
but to accept these terms and often sign agreements without even being 
aware that they include mandatory arbitration provisions.  This allows 
corporations to stack the arbitration clause in their favor by imposing terms 
that make it difficult for individuals to vindicate their rights in arbitration, 
such as bans on aggregate litigation or class actions, secrecy provisions, or 
shortened statutes of limitations—provisions that both scholars and 
arbitration opponents claim unfairly advantage corporate parties and harm 
consumers and employees.9  The only potential backstop is state legislation 
 
 7  The Litigation Center of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been involved with or 
has filed an amicus curiae brief supporting a broad reading of the FAA in virtually every 
arbitration case (and particularly in cases involving FAA preemption) to come before the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the last ten years, in addition to filing amicus briefs urging the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reverse state court and lower court decisions refusing 
to enforce arbitration clauses, and filing amicus briefs in state supreme courts and 
intermediate appellate courts.  It advertises that “The Litigation Center fights for business at 
every level of the U.S. judicial system, on virtually every issue affecting business, including 
class actions and arbitration . . . .”  U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, U.S. CHAMBER COM., 
https://www.uschamber.com/us-chamber-litigation-center (last visited July 17, 2019).  A 
search for “arbitration” on the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center’s webpage reveals the wide 
range of business organizations seeking to expand the scope of the FAA and of FAA 
preemption.  See id. (placing “arbitration” in the search function).  
 8  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-
Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 825, 851–53 n.103 (2012) (listing more than 35 major companies that include 
mandatory arbitration provisions in their standard-form contracts); Imre Stephen Szalai, The 
Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233, 236 (2019) (finding that 81 of the top Fortune 100 companies 
use arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts); Jeff Sovern, “Whimsy Little Contracts” 
with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Study of Consumer Understanding of 
Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2015) (documenting the increasing use of 
mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer and employment contracts and noting that 
companies like PayPal and Verizon require their customers to submit disputes to mandatory 
binding arbitration).  A study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) found 
that arbitration clauses are nearly universal in consumer financial services contracts.  
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS: SECTION 
1028(A) STUDY RESULTS TO DATE 54 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cf 
pb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf. 
 9  See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 
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and public policy doctrine that tries to make arbitration fairer, as the federal 
government has shown little appetite, outside of a few narrow areas, to 
address mandatory arbitration.10  If that backstop is preempted by the FAA, 
then companies can write their arbitration clauses however they wish, with 
virtually no oversight whatsoever. 
Yet, at the same time that corporations are aggressively challenging 
efforts to protect consumers and employees as embodying “judicial 
hostility” to arbitration, they are simultaneously displaying what this article 
refers to as “corporate hostility” to arbitration.  By corporate hostility, I 
refer to situations where corporations carve-out certain claims, procedures 
or remedies from their arbitration clauses because they believe that those 
types of claims are better handled through the courts than through private 
dispute resolution.11  When corporations use carve-outs, they signal that 
litigation is superior to arbitration for certain claims—at the same that they 
argue in court that state legislatures and judges cannot decide that litigation 
is superior to arbitration for those same claims. 
For example, many parties draft arbitration clauses to exclude claims 
for injunctive relief because those parties believe that arbitrators are 
inferior to courts when it comes to enforcing and monitoring an 
injunction.12  But when courts have held that injunctive claims cannot be 
arbitrated because of an arbitrator’s inferior ability to design and manage 
injunctions, corporations and other pro-arbitration groups have asserted—
 
IND. L.J. 239 (2012) (arguing that companies use arbitration clauses to prevent consumers 
and employees from bringing claims against them); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming 
Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive 
Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2015).  Recent statistics in the 
employment arena indicate that companies fare better in arbitration than in court.  See 
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014) (finding employees fare worse in arbitration than in 
litigation); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 68 (2015) (analyzing consumer 
arbitrations from the American Arbitration Association from 2009–2013 and concluding 
that corporate repeat players win at higher rates in arbitration than others and that consumers 
prevail less often than shown in previous studies).   
 10  Indeed, if anything, Congress seems more interested in expanding mandatory 
arbitration than in regulating it.  In 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a 
final rule prohibiting the use of class action bans in arbitration clauses used by financial 
services companies and other entities covered by the CFPB.  Arbitration Agreements, 82 
Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1040).  Congress responded 
by repealing the rule pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, thus permitting financial 
services companies to continue inserting class action bans into their arbitration clauses.  See 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class Action Suits, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-vote-
wall-street-regulation.html. 
 11  See infra Part III (describing different types of carve-outs used in arbitration 
clauses). 
 12  See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
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often successfully—that such a rule is preempted.13  In short, corporations 
are doing the very same things by contract that they are saying state 
lawmakers and judges are forbidden to do through the democratic process. 
While there has been much scholarly consideration of judicial 
hostility to arbitration,14 there has been little study of corporate hostility to 
arbitration.15  This article seeks to identify and draw out the dissonance 
between the two and to consider how it should affect the scope of FAA 
preemption.  It argues that corporate behavior in utilizing carve-outs shows 
that some hostility to arbitration is normal and expected.  It is 
understandable for a contracting party to choose not to require arbitration 
of claims that it thinks arbitration is ill-suited to resolve.  Every decision a 
company makes about what claims to submit to arbitration, or about the 
rules of arbitration, reflects a value judgment about the benefit of 
arbitration versus litigation or the benefit of one kind of arbitration versus 
another. 
If corporations can express hostility to arbitration to further their 
private interest, state governments should be able to express hostility to 
arbitration to protect the public interest.  This article proposes that the fact 
that a state regulation may indicate some hostility to arbitration should not 
automatically trigger preemption.  Rather, just as the FAA permits 
corporate hostility to arbitration, it should permit state hostility to 
arbitration, unless the state law lacks any rational basis or is motivated by 
improper purposes. 
To be sure, one might argue that there is a fundamental difference 
between parties contractually agreeing to restrict arbitration and the state 
imposing limits on arbitration.  The FAA reflects a view that arbitration “is 
a creature of contract” and allows contracting parties, through the process 
of arm’s-length bargaining and negotiation, to decide which claims to 
arbitrate and which to litigate, and to tailor the arbitration process to their 
own needs.16  But this reasoning has little resonance in the current world of 
non-negotiable, take-it-or-leave-it agreements.  Instead, it merely allows a 
self-interested party to set the terms of arbitration to favor its own interests, 
while preventing democratically-elected and democratically-accountable 
lawmakers and judges from acting in the interest of their citizens who may 
 
 13  See infra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.  
 14  See id.  
 15  There has been some study of corporate use of arbitration carve-outs, most notably 
by Chris Drahozal, Steven Ware, and Erin O’Connor.  See infra Part III.A.  But there has 
been no analysis of how corporate practice with respect to carve-outs should be applied to 
FAA preemption doctrine.  
 16  See AT&T, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (stating that the FAA 
protects the contracting parties’ discretion to adopt “efficient, streamlined procedures 
tailored to the type of dispute”).   
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become the victims of unfair and one-sided arbitration provisions. 
This article offers a framework for adjusting FAA preemption 
doctrine to resolve this dichotomy.  Many state efforts to regulate or limit 
arbitration do not reflect a hostility to arbitration in its entirety, but simply 
to certain aspects of arbitration—such as those that unduly restrict parties’ 
rights or unfairly favor one side over the other.  Just as corporate contract 
drafters understand that not all arbitration looks the same and that 
arbitration may be better suited for some claims than others, preemption 
doctrine should similarly reflect that not all hostility to arbitration is 
unwarranted and in fact reflects sound policy judgment.  Thus, when states 
pass legislation affecting arbitration, or when state courts adopt common-
law rules affecting arbitration, reviewing courts should presume that the 
legislature or the court has sound reasons for being hostile to arbitration in 
those circumstances, rather than presuming that the laws are invalid.  This 
approach is both faithful to the FAA and promotes democratic 
accountability by allowing legislatures to carve-out exceptions to 
arbitration to protect their citizens just as corporations carve out exceptions 
to protect their own private interests. 
Part II of this article describes the current state of FAA preemption 
doctrine and how corporate organizations have fought to expand the FAA’s 
preemptive scope.  Part III addresses corporate hostility to arbitration and 
identifies the ways that parties drafting arbitration clauses carve-out certain 
claims or remedies from their clauses either because they believe the claims 
are better suited for litigation or because they want to prevent plaintiffs 
from bringing claims in arbitration.  Part IV examines how the current 
doctrine of allowing corporate hostility but disallowing legislative hostility 
undermines democratic accountability and is unwarranted.  Part V 
addresses how corporate hostility to arbitration should affect FAA 
preemption and offers two proposals for how it could justify narrowing the 
FAA’s preemptive scope. 
II. THE SCOPE OF FAA PREEMPTION 
Driving the doctrine of FAA preemption is the notion that the FAA 
was enacted to overcome perceived “judicial hostility” to arbitration.17  The 
FAA was drafted in the early twentieth century by an American Bar 
Association Committee and was ultimately enacted by Congress in 1925.18  
According to the Act’s drafters, federal judges at that time were hostile to 
the idea that arbitration was an adequate substitute for courts and were 
 
 17  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Bruce, 513 U.S. 265, 272–73 (1995). 
 18  See generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE 15–95 (2013) (detailing the 
history of the FAA’s drafting and enactment).  
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routinely refusing to enforce arbitration clauses.19  Their refusal derived 
from two doctrines that the drafters concluded reflected a hostility toward 
arbitration vis-à-vis courts.  The first was the “ouster” doctrine, under 
which federal courts refused to enforce any provision that would “oust” 
them of jurisdiction and transfer it to private arbitrators.20  The second was 
the “dual agency doctrine,” which “maintained that an arbitrator was 
merely a dual agent of the parties and, as such, either party could revoke 
his authority at any time.”21  As a result, arbitration clauses were essentially 
“revocable at will” by either party to the agreement.22  According to the 
Act’s drafters, judges were refusing to grant specific performance when a 
party breached an arbitration agreement, simply because the breach 
involved arbitration.23  In doing so, they were treating arbitration clauses 
less favorably than other contracts on the ground that arbitration could not 
be a substitute for the court’s jurisdiction: hence, “judicial hostility” to 
arbitration. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this history to mean that the 
FAA was enacted to overcome “longstanding judicial hostility” to 
arbitration agreements that existed dating back to English common law, 
and to place arbitration agreements on “the same footing” with other 
 
 19  See Cole, supra note 3, at 762–63 (describing how, prior to the FAA’s enactment, 
many American courts refused to enforce arbitration clauses). 
 20   See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 74 
(1997); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 
646 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 
13–15 (1924) (discussing the need for an arbitration statute in order to overcome problems 
created by the ouster doctrine).  The ouster doctrine was criticized for being overly 
formalistic, reflecting an irrational judicial hostility to arbitration, and unduly interfering 
with the freedom of contract.  See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. S/A, v. Amtorg Trading 
Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982–84 (2d Cir. 1942); Ezell v. Rocky Mtn. Bean & Elevator Co., 232 
P. 680 (Colo. 1925); Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, Carver Cty., 296 N.W. 
475, 477 (Minn. 1941) (“Arbitration simply removes a controversy from the arena of 
litigation.  It is no more an ouster of judicial jurisdiction than is compromise and settlement 
or that peculiar offspring of legal ingenuity known as the covenant not to sue.  Each 
disposes of issues without litigation.  One no more than the other ousts the courts of 
jurisdiction.”).  See also Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: 
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 61–63 (1997) (describing some 
criticisms of the ouster doctrine). 
 21  Schwartz, supra note 20, at 74.  See also Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate 
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 637, 645 (1996). 
 22  See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court 
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 
101 (2006); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 74. 
 23  Moses, supra note 22, at 101 (noting that prior to the enactment of the FAA, “a party 
to an arbitration agreement could at any time prior to the award simply refuse to arbitrate 
and courts would not enforce the agreement”). 
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contracts.24  The Act states that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”25  In other words, arbitration 
clauses should be enforced in the same way as any other contract, and they 
also should be subject to the same defenses—such as duress, 
unconscionability, or lack of consideration—that apply equally to all 
contracts. 
The principle that any rule treating arbitration clauses less favorably 
than other contracts embodies a hostility to arbitration has become the 
driving force in determining the FAA’s power to preempt state law.  The 
Supreme Court has held that Section 2 of the FAA, which makes arbitration 
clauses enforceable, is substantive law that preempts and overrides 
conflicting state law.26 
The particular preemption paradigm in which the FAA operates is 
known as “implied conflict preemption” or “implied obstacle 
preemption.”27  Under this framework, the FAA preempts any “state-law 
rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”28  Importantly, state laws need not expressly target arbitration, 
as the FAA also preempts laws that are implicitly hostile to arbitration.  
This means that the FAA preempts both rules that forbid arbitration 
outright, as well as rules or contract principles “that derive their meaning 
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”29  In addition, rules 
that are generally applicable to all contracts but that target arbitration 
through “more subtle methods” by interfering with arbitration’s 
fundamental attributes also are preempted.30  Interestingly, although the 
original motivation for the FAA was to overcome judicial refusal to order 
specific performance of arbitration agreements, courts have applied the 
FAA to preempt state statutes and regulations in addition to judicially-
 
 24  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
 25  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).  
 26  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
 27  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (holding that the 
FAA overrides “state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
FAA’s objectives”).  In addition to conflict preemption, there are two other preemption 
doctrines.  The doctrine of “express preemption” applies when a federal statute contains an 
express preemption provision, which is then applied in conformance with the statutory 
language.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. St. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 203 (1983) (“Congress may preempt state authority by saying so in express terms.”).  
In addition, field preemption occurs where Congress intended to entirely displace any state 
regulation in a particular area.  Id. at 204.  
 28  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343. 
 29  Id. at 339.  
 30  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).  
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created rules.31 
As a result, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied 
preemption principles to invalidate numerous state laws on the ground that 
they subject arbitration clauses to less favorable treatment than other 
contracts and thus conflict with the FAA.  For example, courts have found 
that the FAA preempts rules barring certain types of claims from 
arbitration,32 laws that make arbitration agreements unenforceable when 
they deprive individuals of the ability to vindicate their rights,33 laws 
designed to help consumers understand that a contract contains an 
arbitration clause,34 laws that do not target arbitration specifically but that 
only apply to certain categories of contracts,35 procedural rules relating to 
who decides a dispute about the enforceability of an arbitration clause or 
the level of appellate review an arbitration award can receive,36 and public 
policy doctrines that attempt to combat abusive practices in arbitration.37 
 
 31  See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (indicating that “state law, 
whether of legislative or judicial origin” will be preempted if it singles out arbitration for 
disfavored treatment and holding that the FAA preempted a provision of the California 
Labor Code requiring a judicial forum for the resolution of wage disputes).  See also Preston 
v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356 (2008) (holding that the FAA preempts a state law granting a 
state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate). 
 32  See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532 (2012) (finding 
that the FAA preempted a West Virginia rule prohibiting mandatory arbitration of wrongful 
death and personal injury claims against nursing homes). 
 33  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351 (holding that “States cannot require a procedure that is 
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons” and concluding that 
even if a class action ban precludes individuals from vindicating their rights states cannot 
preclude companies from including a class action ban in an arbitration clause).  
 34  See Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996). 
 35  See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the FAA 
preempted portions of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act because the act was 
limited to consumers and therefore did not apply to all contracts). 
 36  See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 581–83 (2008) (holding that 
the FAA precludes rules that expand the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award 
beyond the grounds provided in the FAA itself); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 
546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (finding that FAA requires certain challenges to contracts 
containing an arbitration clause to be decided by the arbitrator, notwithstanding state-law 
rules to the contrary). 
 37  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351.  Corporate organizations have pushed strongly for 
the Supreme Court to hold that the FAA preempts state public policy doctrines meant to 
promote fairness, when they are applied to arbitration clauses.  See, e.g., Brief for Pac. Legal 
Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12–13, Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. 
Moreno, 573 U.S. 904 (2014) (No. 13-856).  Clarence Thomas has expressed some 
sympathy to the view that the FAA preempts public policy defenses.  See Concepcion, 563 
U.S. at 352–57 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the FAA only permits challenges 
to the formation of an arbitration clause rather than its enforceability, and that the Act would 
preempt state rules that make arbitration clauses unenforceable on public policy grounds).  
For one attempt to catalog the wide variety of state laws that courts have found preempted 
by the FAA, see David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 154–
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The only type of law that will not be preempted, per the FAA’s 
savings clause, is a law that is generally applicable to all contracts, namely 
one that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”38  
For example, a decision finding that an arbitration clause is unconscionable 
generally will not be preempted because the doctrine of unconscionability 
applies to all contracts.39  But even then, a generally applicable rule like 
unconscionability may be preempted if applying it would interfere with 
“fundamental attributes of arbitration.”40  For example, the Supreme Court 
found that a state law declaring that certain arbitration clauses containing 
class-action waivers were unconscionable and requiring that class claims be 
resolvable in arbitration was preempted because class-wide proceedings 
would conflict with arbitration’s fundamental attributes of a streamlined, 
and procedurally flexible process.41  Additionally, a state rule may be 
preempted if it is applied disproportionately to arbitration agreements in a 
way that disfavors arbitration or affects fundamental attributes of 
arbitration, because the disparate application may reflect back-door 
hostility to arbitration relative to other contracts.42 
Although these laws are preempted under the broad mantle that they 
express hostility to arbitration, the general label of hostility can be broken 
down into two categories.  One category encompasses laws that reflect a 
view that arbitration, or arbitration in a particular form, is inferior to 
litigation.43  For example, a rule requiring that all dispute resolution 
 
59 (2004) (identifying forty-nine different state statutes that were found preempted by 
judicial decisions from January 2002 to April 2004).  
 38  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).  Thus, state law applies if it was enacted “to govern issues 
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”  Perry v. 
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987). 
 39  See generally Richard Frankel, Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion: Why 
Unconscionability Survives the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence, 2014 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 225 (2014) (describing the state of the unconscionability defense after Concepcion 
and explaining that generally applicable contract rules ordinarily are not preempted, unless 
they interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration); see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. 
Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418 (2019) (explaining that neutral, non-discriminatory rules that 
apply to all contracts, such as unconscionability, ordinarily are not preempted, but that they 
can be preempted if they conflict with fundamental attributes of arbitration). 
 40  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.   
 41  Id. at 344–45. 
 42  Id. at 342 (indicating that a rule requiring judicially-monitored discovery could be 
preempted because even though it is facially neutral, “the rule would have a 
disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements” and could interfere with arbitration’s 
fundamental attributes).  
 43  See, e.g., Andermann v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 785 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (7th Cir. 
2015) (describing the FAA as establishing that “judges should not allow any preference they 
might have for judicial resolution of a legal dispute to override the parties’ dispute-
resolution preferences as embodied in an arbitration clause”); Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 801 (10th Cir. 1995) (Jenkins, J., concurring) (“I believe part of the 
reason for the historical hostility towards arbitration agreements was the conventional 
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proceedings, including arbitration, must follow the Federal Rules of 
Evidence indicates a dissatisfaction with streamlined procedures and 
expresses a preference to make arbitration more like litigation.  The rule 
may be generally applicable, but it evinces a suspicion of arbitration vis-à-
vis litigation.  A second category encompasses laws that express no view 
on the relative merits of arbitration versus litigation, but that treat 
arbitration provisions differently from other contractual provisions.  One 
example is a law that requires arbitration clauses to appear on the front 
page of a contract in bold print.44  Both categories may be seen as 
expressing hostility to arbitration, but for different reasons. 
The courts’ willingness to apply the FAA to override a wide variety of 
state laws that affect arbitration clauses is significant.  The growing use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses, particularly by large corporations that 
impose mandatory arbitration as part of their non-negotiable standard-form 
contracts with their customers and employees, is enormously controversial.  
Critics of binding mandatory arbitration claim that it is inferior to litigation 
because the arbitration system stacks the deck in favor of corporations at 
the expense of consumers and employees.  Arbitration opponents assert that 
many corporations draft arbitration clauses with terms that are designed to 
make it difficult or even impossible for individual claimants to succeed, 
such as by barring aggregate litigation or class actions, shortening statutes 
of limitations, requiring the parties to keep the arbitration proceedings 
secret, and by limiting the ability of parties to seek discovery or obtain 
necessary evidence to support their claims.45  They also argue that 
 
wisdom that the litigation process was superior to alternative forms of dispute resolution, 
such as arbitration.”); Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774, 815 n.33 (NLRB 2014) 
(Johnson, Board Member, dissenting) (“[T]he FAA precludes any court, or this Agency, 
from regarding arbitration as inferior to litigation generally.”), overruled on other grounds 
by Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 44  It is somewhat unclear whether such a law would be preempted, though it likely 
would.  The Supreme Court previously invalidated just such a law in Doctor’s Associates, 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).  More recently, however, the Court opined in dicta 
that state rules making arbitration agreements or specific provisions in those agreements 
more prominently displayed might not be preempted.  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347 n.6. 
 45  See, e.g., F. PAUL BLAND ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 4–14 
(NCLC 7th ed. 2014) (canvassing the various criticisms of binding mandatory arbitration).  
The impact of class action bans is hard to understate.  By one measure, in the financial 
services sector alone, the use of class action bans has enriched corporations by more than 
half a billion dollars per year.  The CFPB, in a comprehensive study of arbitration 
provisions in consumer financial services contracts, found that consumers who initiated 
individual arbitrations in the years 2010–2011 received total relief of $172,433, and 
$189,107 total debt forbearance.  By contrast, during the period of 2008–2012, the study 
found that class actions involving financial services products provided total relief of $540 
million per year to an average of 70 million consumers a year.  And that number does not 
account for the additional value of any injunctive relief those class actions provided.  See 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO 
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arbitration creates a “repeat player bias” whereby arbitrators are inclined to 
support the repeat player—most often the corporation—out of fear that 
they will not be chosen by the company for future cases if they rule against 
it, though evidence regarding the bias so far appears inconclusive.46  
Detractors point out that arbitrators act in secret, that arbitrators are not 
bound to apply the law in the way that judges are, and that the FAA 
provides for extremely limited judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision.47  
Some recent studies suggest that consumers and employees fare less well in 
arbitration than they do in litigation.48 
By contrast, supporters assert that arbitration offers a faster, cheaper 
and more efficient alternative to litigation.49  They note that arbitration 
offers greater predictability to businesses, and helps reduce the passing of 
litigation costs onto consumers through higher prices.50  Supporters argue 
that arbitration may increase access to justice for many individuals who 
may find that they cannot seek redress in court because litigation has 
 
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), §§ 1.4.3–
1.4.7 (Mar. 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-
report-to-congress-2015.pdf [hereinafter “CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY”]. 
 46  See e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of 
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 
(1998); BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, § 1.3.3 (“There is some empirical evidence and a good 
deal of commentary suggesting that arbitrators do, in fact, have a tendency to favor ‘repeat 
player’ clients.”).  But see SEARLE CIV. JUST. INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION PRELIMINARY REPORT 13–16 (Mar. 2009), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Searle%20Civil%20Justice%20
Institute%20Report%20on%20Consumer%20Arbitration.pdf (finding no statistically 
significant repeat-player effect in its analysis of American Arbitration Association data and 
ascribing any repeat-player effect to better case screening by repeat-players than to 
arbitrator bias).  
 47  Section 10 of the FAA provides the grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s award.  
Those grounds are mostly limited to whether the award resulted from corruption or fraud, or 
if the arbitrators grossly exceeded their powers.  9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018).  The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the grounds for vacating an award extremely narrowly.  See, e.g., Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2002).  
 48  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 49  See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in 
Consumer Contracts, 17TH ANN. CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES INST. 221–22 (2012) (describing 
one study of arbitration participants showing that a majority thought that arbitration was 
faster, cheaper and simpler than going to court); Dwight Golann, Developments in 
Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 43 BUS. LAW. 1081, 1091 (1988) (“The primary 
advantage for consumers in binding arbitration is that it offers at least the possibility of a 
faster and cheaper decisionmaking mechanism for their complaints.”).  
 50  See, e.g., The “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007”: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 12–13 (2007) (testimony of Peter B. Rutledge) 
(arguing that eliminating mandatory arbitration would “increase the costs of dispute 
resolution, and a portion of these costs would be passed onto employees (in the form of 
lower wages), consumers (in the form of higher prices) and investors (in the form of lower 
share prices)”). 
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become too expensive and time consuming.51 
Ordinarily, if some legal principle, rule, or regime is considered 
flawed or unfair in particular ways, state legislatures, state agencies, and 
courts can correct those flaws through legislation, regulation, and common-
law rule making.  For example, if state legislators believe that arbitration 
provides insufficient discovery and thus prevents consumers from proving 
their claims, or that arbitration is too costly and so consumers cannot afford 
it, an ordinary response would be to enact laws allowing for greater 
discovery in arbitration or limiting arbitration costs.  But under current 
doctrine, that is precisely what the FAA bars courts from doing, because 
such laws arguably reflect a belief that arbitration is an inferior alternative 
to litigation absent such protections. 
As FAA preemption broadens, corporate parties have greater freedom 
to design their arbitration clauses however they want without being subject 
to any state regulation designed to counteract their most self-interested 
impulses.  Businesses and organizations acting on behalf of business have 
aggressively pushed courts to give the FAA an ever-broader preemptive 
effect so as to displace a greater body of state laws that attempt to regulate 
arbitration.  Thanks in large part to the litigation strategies of business 
interests, the Supreme Court’s view of what counts as hostility to 
arbitration has expanded in recent years, particularly in the area of class 
actions.52 
Thus, states have very limited power to regulate arbitration.  Even 
consumer groups and other advocacy groups that have drafted model state 
laws related to arbitration have recognized how powerfully the FAA (as 
currently interpreted) limits state power to engage in legislative reform. 53  
For example, the National Consumer Law Center’s Model Act is just as 
notable for what it does not do as for what it does do.  It does not invalidate 
mandatory arbitration as to any specific type of claim, does not require the 
imposition of any specific contract terms to make arbitration clauses fairer, 
nor indicate that arbitration is inferior to litigation for resolving particular 
 
 51  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563–
64 (2001) (claiming that mandatory arbitration actually expands opportunities by giving 
plaintiffs the ability to bring cases that they could not bring in court); see also Circuit City, 
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2000) (“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the 
costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment litigation, 
which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial 
contracts.”). 
 52  See Stipanowich, supra note 6, at 325–26.  
 53  The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) has drafted a “Model State Consumer 
& Employee Justice Enforcement Act” that addresses mandatory arbitration.  DAVID 
SELIGMANN, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., THE MODEL STATE CONSUMER & EMPLOYEE JUSTICE 
ENFORCEMENT ACT (2015).  
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types of claims.  That is likely because such provisions would create a 
significant risk of being preempted.54  Rather it focuses on contracts of 
companies that do business with the state, claims involving public 
injunctions, defining and applying general unconscionability principles to 
arbitration clauses, and requiring clear notice of the presence of an 
arbitration clause in standard form contracts.55 
The principle of hostility to arbitration as a touchstone of preemption 
has expanded so widely that it has become unmoored from its original 
conception.  The original form of hostility that the FAA drafters were 
responding to was judicial refusal to enforce arbitration clauses for any 
reason.  The drafters did not say that arbitration was always superior (or at 
least equivalent) to litigation, or that arbitration could never operate in an 
unfair or flawed manner.  There is a big gap between saying that 
legislatures and courts cannot prohibit arbitration altogether and saying that 
legislatures and courts cannot regulate arbitration to make it fair and 
balanced for both parties.  But current FAA preemption doctrine equates 
the two. 
Yet, hostility to arbitration is not expressed only by state legislatures 
and courts. Corporations also express hostility to arbitration in multiple 
ways.  This article examines how corporate parties express hostility to 
arbitration by carving out certain claims, remedies and procedures from 
their arbitration provisions.  Comparing this “corporate hostility” to 
arbitration to the various kinds of state-government hostility to arbitration 
that the FAA treats as preempted is instructive in evaluating how far FAA 
preemption doctrine should reach.  This corporate hostility to arbitration is 
described in the next section. 
III. CORPORATE HOSTILITY TO ARBITRATION 
At the same time that corporations argue that state laws regulating 
arbitration are hostile to arbitration and therefore preempted, they also 
express their own corporate hostility to arbitration in the way that they draft 
their arbitration clauses.  They do so by deciding which disputes will be 
arbitrated, under which conditions, and utilizing which procedures.  Most 
commonly, a company’s hostility to arbitration is represented in the form 
of a carve out.  A carve out is where a party includes an arbitration clause 
in its contract but “carves out” certain claims from arbitration—such as 
claims for injunctive relief, claims for collection of unpaid debts, or claims 
to protect trade secrets—and reserves disputes regarding those claims for 
 
 54  See id. at 12–15 (describing the scope and limits of FAA preemption as background 
for understanding what areas the model act covers).  
 55  See id. 
FRANKEL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019  3:57 PM 
722 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:707 
litigation.56  In addition, a company may establish specific procedures for 
arbitration that bring it closer to litigation, say by providing for expanded 
discovery or requiring the arbitration proceeding to comply with the rules 
of evidence.  I refer to this conduct as “corporate hostility” because most 
arbitration clauses are drafted by companies, either in standard-form 
adhesion contracts with consumers and employees, or in their contracts 
with other companies.57 
At the outset, it is worth clarifying that there is nothing inherently 
wrong about expressing hostility to arbitration.  The decision to carve out a 
particular dispute from an arbitration clause simply reflects a judgment by 
the drafting party that litigation is a superior mechanism to arbitration for 
resolving that particular dispute.  Similarly, adding specific procedural 
requirements that approximate court procedures may reflect a judgment 
that judicial-type processes may be preferable to the traditional streamlined 
arbitration process in certain circumstances.  At its broadest level, every 
decision a company makes about whether to use an arbitration clause, or 
about the terms of the arbitration clause, reflects a value judgment about 
the relative merits of arbitration vis-à-vis litigation or the company’s 
comfort level with arbitral-type proceedings.  A corporation’s decision to 
use an arbitration clause at all may indicate that it feels that, on the whole, 
arbitration is a superior form of dispute resolution for the corporation as 
compared to litigation.  And vice versa, a decision not to use an arbitration 
clause may reflect a preference for litigation over arbitration.58  A company 
that uses an arbitration clause in its contracts with consumers but not in its 
contracts with other corporations (a frequent practice)59 may indicate that 
the company thinks that arbitration is inferior to litigation for disputes that 
are likely to arise with other corporations but that arbitration is superior for 
the types of disputes likely to arise with consumers.  In short, companies 
may have various reasons for preferring one form of dispute resolution to 
another.  That is normal and expected. 
This understanding that parties to an agreement will always express 
some hostility to either arbitration or litigation is implicit in courts’ analysis 
of the FAA.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that it is a 
 
 56  See infra Part III.A.  
 57  See supra note 8 and accompanying text (documenting the wide range of large 
companies that utilize contracts requiring parties to submit disputes to binding arbitration). 
 58  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An 
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held 
Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336 (2007) (suggesting that corporations’ decisions 
not to use an arbitration clause indicates that those actors “prefer litigation to arbitration, 
encounter obstacles to negotiating mutually satisfactory contract terms that include 
arbitration clauses, or some combination of these factors”).   
 59  See infra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. 
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fundamental principle of the FAA that “arbitration is a matter of 
contract,”60 and that one of the main benefits of arbitration is that it 
“afford[s] parties discretion in designing arbitration processes” that are 
“tailored to the type of dispute.”61  When choosing specific “arbitration 
processes” or specific claims that will be subject to arbitration, the contract 
drafter is making a value judgment that the terms it imposes are preferable 
to the terms it rejects, and that the selected terms best serve its interest.  
Courts have defined hostility, within the meaning of the FAA, as a 
preference for litigation over arbitration.62  Under that definition, it is 
impossible to have choice without also having hostility.  In short, the 
essence of private, contracted-for dispute resolution is a preference for one 
form of dispute resolution and therefore, by definition, a hostility to the 
other. 
Similarly, when the federal government has regulated arbitration 
(since it does not have to worry about preemption), it normally has done so 
by carving out specific types of claims from the FAA’s reach.  For 
example, Congress has restricted the use of mandatory arbitration 
agreements for whistleblower retaliation claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX),63 in home mortgage loans,64 in consumer credit contracts to 
active duty military personnel or their dependents,65 in contracts between 
franchised auto dealers and auto manufacturers,66 and in contracts between 
poultry farmers and purchasers.67  Additionally, the FAA itself expresses 
hostility to arbitration by carving out contracts of employment for workers 
engaged in interstate commerce as exempt from the Act.68 
 
 60  Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).  
 61  AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
 62  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 63  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2018). 
 64  15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1) (2018). 
 65  10 U.S.C. § 987(e)-(f) (2018). 
 66  15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2018). 
 67  7 U.S.C. § 197c (2018); see also Cole, supra note 3, at 780 (stating that when 
Congress has regulated arbitration, it “has taken a piecemeal approach, proposing 
amendments to exempt certain kinds of disputes from the FAA” rather than changing the 
arbitration process itself).   
 68  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (stating that the FAA does not apply to “contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce.”).  Many scholars believe that this provision was intended to 
exempt all employment contracts from the Act.  See, e.g., SZALAI, supra note 18, at 191–92 
(examining the history surrounding the adoption of the FAA and concluding that the drafters 
intended to exempt all workplace disputes from the Act); Matthew W. Finkin, “Workers’ 
Contracts” Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 
17 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996) (same).  The Supreme Court, however, held that 
section 1 only exempts contracts with workers who work directly in interstate commerce, 
such as interstate transportation workers.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 
109 (2001).  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court also recently clarified that the provision 
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If hostility to arbitration means, as courts have held, a view that 
arbitration is inferior to litigation, then corporations express a significant 
amount of hostility to arbitration.  This section looks at two forms of 
corporate hostility to arbitration.  One type is where corporations use carve-
outs or other provisions to indicate that they see litigation as superior to 
arbitration for certain disputes.  The second type is where companies use 
arbitration clauses to express hostility toward both arbitration and 
litigation—i.e., where the goal of the arbitration clause is not to move a 
dispute from court to arbitration, but to prevent the dispute from being 
addressed in any forum.  This section suggests that both forms of corporate 
hostility are intended to promote the corporation’s private self-interest, 
often at the expense of the potential opposing party in any dispute.  Finally, 
it places these corporate practices within the context of the landscape of 
current litigation involving carve-outs. 
A. Contracts that Reflect a View that Arbitration Is Inferior to 
Litigation for Resolving Certain Disputes 
First, many companies express hostility to arbitration by carving out 
various types of claims from their arbitration clauses.  These carve-outs 
indicate that companies believe arbitration to be inferior to litigation for 
resolving some types of disputes.  Professors Christopher Drahozal and 
Erin O’Connor studied arbitration clauses from various contractual settings 
to see what kinds of claims were commonly carved out.69  They found that 
arbitration clauses commonly carved out (a) claims for injunctive relief; (b) 
claims to protect confidential information, such as trade secrets; (c) claims 
that could affect the rights of third parties, such as in rem adjudications; 
and (d) claims for money owed, such as debt collections.70  The majority of 
arbitration provisions they examined had some form of carve-out.  In some 
sectors, nearly all the arbitration clauses had a carve-out.71  They also found 
that where there is a large disparity in bargaining power between the 
parties, “carve-outs will appear at very high rates.”72  This fact suggests 
that the greater leverage the drafting party has, the more likely the party is 
 
covers both employees and independent contractors who work in interstate commerce.  New 
Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 542–43 (2019).  
 69  Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-
Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1951 (2014) [hereinafter “Drahozal & 
O’Connor”].   
 70  Id. at 1967–68. 
 71  Id. at 1967 (“Carve-outs are present in essentially all franchise contract arbitration 
clauses, nearly two-thirds of domestic and cross-border technology contract arbitration 
clauses, and about one-half of domestic joint venture agreement arbitration clauses and CEO 
employment contract arbitration clauses.”). 
 72  Id. at 1968. 
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to include a carve-out.  In turn, this suggests that companies include carve-
outs in their arbitration clauses because they perceive carve-outs as 
advantageous or in their self-interest. 
These carve-outs likely indicate a preference for litigation over 
arbitration for specific types of claims.  For example, the fact that 
companies often exempt claims for injunctive relief reflects that courts may 
be better suited than arbitrators for issuing, enforcing, and monitoring 
injunctions.  Court have clearly defined structures for granting emergency 
relief, such as temporary restraining orders, that offer greater reliability 
than arbitration.73  Courts can award emergency relief almost immediately.  
In arbitration, such relief must await appointment of an arbitrator, and that 
appointment can be delayed by the party opposing emergency relief.74 
Similarly, companies carve out injunctive claims because they believe 
that “courts can more efficiently and effectively resolve disputes involving 
requests for injunctive relief.”75  Courts have greater institutional powers, 
including contempt power, to ensure enforcement of an injunction. 76  
Courts also may have a greater ability than arbitrators—whose authority 
comes from the parties to the dispute—to enforce injunctive relief that may 
affect the rights of third parties.77  Further, arbitrators may lack the 
authority to provide oversight and monitoring of an ongoing injunctive 
decree, and may also lack the ability to modify, dissolve, or amend an 
existing injunction.78  Unlike courts, which retain continuing jurisdiction 
over final injunctive relief, an arbitrator’s authority often ends at the 
conclusion of the proceeding, and thus the only way to affect an ongoing 
injunction would be to initiate a new arbitration proceeding.79  Given how 
cumbersome these procedures are, parties may sensibly conclude that 
arbitration is an inferior venue to court for addressing claims for injunctive 
relief. 
 
 73  See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (Or Not 
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 456 (2010) (“[C]ourts also 
are better suited than arbitrators to grant emergency relief, such as a temporary restraining 
order (TRO).”); see also id. at 436 (stating that emergency relief is something “arbitration is 
ill-suited to provide”). 
 74  Id. at 457. 
 75  Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1993. 
 76  Id. at 1971 (“Arbitrators have the authority to order injunctive relief, but without the 
contempt power of the courts, an arbitrator’s award may prove ineffective.”).   
 77  See, e.g., Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 988 P.2d 67, 77 (Cal. 1999) (discussing 
how third parties may not be able to benefit from an injunction ordered by an arbitrator); see 
also Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1967–68 (noting that carve-outs are often used 
for claims that could affect the rights of third-parties to the dispute). 
 78  See, e.g., Broughton, 988 P.2d at 77 (describing arbitrators’ limitations with respect 
to injunctive relief). 
 79  See id. 
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Claims for the protection of trade secrets and confidential information, 
protection of intellectual property, or the enforcement of non-compete 
clauses are often carved out from arbitration.80  In part, this is because the 
primary remedy in those disputes is injunctive relief, “a remedy that courts 
are more effective at providing.”81  Even as to the underlying merits of 
intellectual property disputes, such carve-outs can indicate that the 
company views the right to litigate in court rather than arbitrate as a 
“legitimate commercial need,” and that courts provide an “extra margin of 
safety” with respect to intellectual property claims that arbitrators do not.82 
Claims for money owed, such as debt collection or failure to pay on a 
loan, also are commonly carved out of arbitration clauses.83  Parties 
drafting arbitration clauses may perceive debt collection and loan cases as 
ones where the law is generally clear and well-defined.84  In such cases, 
parties may be suspicious of arbitration because they fear that arbitrators 
are less likely to follow the law and more likely to split the difference 
between the parties.85  When the law is clear, arbitrator expertise is less 
necessary, and arbitration may be less efficient and more expensive, 
because parties must take the additional step of confirming the arbitration 
award in court before the award is final and binding.86  In fact, studies of 
business-to-business loan and credit contracts show that loan contracts are 
unlikely to include arbitration provisions at all, because the disputes are 
likely to be clear and courts have substantial experience with them.87 
Companies also tend to carve out claims where the company is more 
likely to be the plaintiff and the consumer or employee is more likely to be 
the defendant, while still requiring arbitration for claims where the 
company is likely to be the defendant.  In debt collection claims, 
companies tend to be plaintiffs and the consumers tend to be defendants.88  
 
 80  See, e.g., Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2016) (contract 
required arbitration of all disputes “[e]xcept for disputes relating to intellectual property 
rights, obligations, or any infringement claims”). 
 81  Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1967. 
 82  Tompkins, 840 F.3d at 1031. 
 83  Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1968; see also Cain v. Midland Funding, 
LLC, 156 A.3d 307 (Md. 2017) (arbitration clause allowed lender to bring collection action 
against credit card debtor in small claims court). 
 84  Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 456, 460–61.   
 85  See id. 
 86  Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1968; Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 
456. 
 87  Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 460–61 (citing Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to 
Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 231 
(2000) (“Most loan contracts are relatively clear, and courts have a great deal of experience 
with them.”)). 
 88  See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer 
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 97 (2001) (explaining that debt collection 
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Moreover, many debt collection claims result in default judgments, and 
companies prefer courts because they can more quickly and easily obtain 
and enforce those judgments against debtors.89  Similarly, many arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts will carve out claims for self-help 
repossession of homes, automobiles, or other purchases, or for enforcement 
of non-compete clauses.90  Some clauses are even more explicit and simply 
give the drafting party the right to pursue any claim in court while requiring 
the consumer or employee to submit any disputes to arbitration.91 
Such clauses evince a corporate hostility to arbitration as a plaintiff 
but a preference for arbitration as a defendant.  That may mean that 
companies employing such carve-outs perceive arbitration as 
systematically favoring defendants and as being an inferior alternative to 
litigation for plaintiffs.  Such a view is not surprising, as there are various 
ways in which arbitration may favor defendants.  For example, arbitration 
does not provide for nearly as much discovery as litigation (unless the 
parties agree to import litigation-like discovery procedures into arbitration), 
which makes it harder for the plaintiff to build his or her case.92 
Companies also are likely to carve out disputes that carry a risk of 
high damages awards, or “bet the company” cases.93  And they do so 
because they feel that arbitration is ill-suited to address large-dollar claims, 
in part because of the risk of a high-dollar award combined with 
arbitration’s extreme limitations on appellate review.94  When it comes to 
cases that have potentially large stakes from the company’s perspective, 
 
and repossession actions comprise nearly all the claims that a lender will affirmatively assert 
against a borrower). 
 89  See id. at 97–98. 
 90  See id. at 97 (“For example, some consumer credit agreements require arbitration of 
all claims except for: (1) collection actions; and (2) actions to preserve, repossess or 
foreclose on collateral.”).  See also Brief of Appellee Option One Mortg. Corp. at 33-35, 
Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115 (2007) (No. 50 EAP 2005), 2006 WL 
2923022 (listing numerous examples of arbitration clauses that carved out foreclosure and 
repossession claims). 
 91  See BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, §§ 5.3.1, 6.7.3 (giving examples of cases involving 
non-mutual arbitration clauses); White v. ACell, Inc., 779 F. App’x 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 
2019) (allowing the employer, but not the employee, to bring certain claims for injunctive 
relief in court). 
 92  See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 61 (“The unavailability of discovery skews the 
system in favor of the corporate defendant.  The plaintiff has the burden of production of 
evidence, much of which the defendant may well possess . . . .  The combination of these 
factors make[s] arbitration a highly attractive alternative to litigation for corporate 
defendants in many circumstances.”). 
 93  See Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1992; Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, 
at 436. 
 94  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350–51 (2011) 
(“Arbitration is poorly suited to the high stakes of class litigation . . . .  We find it hard to 
believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review . . . .”). 
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companies often want “the full panoply of procedural protection afforded 
by court and full appeal rights” and thus prefer litigation.95  Companies 
may worry about a large award that could have a potentially devastating 
effect on its bottom line.96  At the same time, however, companies routinely 
use arbitration clauses that prohibit consumers from bringing class actions, 
and instead require individualized arbitrations.97  In defending arbitration in 
general and class action bans in particular, companies and other supporters 
of arbitration tout that arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation, in no 
small part because of the limited ability to appeal an arbitration award, as 
appeals add both substantial cost, time, and uncertainty to a case.98 
While this might not seem noteworthy at first blush, such carve-outs 
express significant hostility to arbitration.  In essence, these carve-outs 
indicate that the more important a company considers a case to be, the 
more that arbitration is inferior to the courts for deciding it.  Stating that 
arbitration is acceptable only for cases that do not matter—and not for 
cases that do matter—conflicts with the view that arbitration is just as good 
as litigation for resolving disputes. 
In addition to situations where drafting parties carve out specific 
substantive claims from the arbitration provision, they also may use carve-
outs to avoid the procedural aspects of arbitration that they find inferior to 
litigation.  Procedural carve-outs include situations where companies 
require arbitration for most disputes but import litigation-type procedures 
 
 95  Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 454.   
 96  Id. at 455 (quoting Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a 
Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 79–80 (2008)).  There is a level of 
hypocrisy about this that feels troubling.  This carve-out prioritizes only cases that are large-
stakes or important to the company, not ones that are important to the individual plaintiff.  A 
case that involves small dollars for the company’s perspective may be immensely valuable 
to the consumer.  Also, that does not even consider the dignitary interests the consumer has 
in having his or her case decided fairly and accurately.  While companies can preserve 
appellate rights for judgments that may hurt them, however, the consumer or employee does 
not get the opportunity to carve out claims where an adverse judgment would be devastating 
to that individual.  This includes cases like bankruptcy that have a dramatic effect on an 
individuals’ future.  See BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, § 4.3.3 (identifying the debate around 
what types of claims asserted in bankruptcy can be subject to mandatory arbitration). 
 97  The CFPB found that in the financial services sector eighty-five percent of contracts 
with arbitration agreements, which accounted for ninety-nine percent of overall market 
share, contained class action bans. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at 10.  
Another study found that all the business-to-consumer arbitration clauses it studied 
contained a class action ban.  Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, 
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and 
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 884 (2008).   
 98  See, e.g., David K. Taylor, Binding Arbitration: Limited Appeal Rights – Finality Is 
the Rule, CONSTRUCTION AND PROCUREMENT L. NEWS (June 1, 2016), https://www.bradley.c 
om/insights/publications/2016/06/binding-arbitration-limited-appeal-rights-finality-is-the-
rule (explaining that parties in the construction industry like limited appeal rights because it 
provides for finality). 
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into the arbitration process.  By doing so, the drafting party signals that it 
finds the procedural informality and flexibility of arbitration to be inferior 
to litigation and prefers to make arbitration look more like judicial dispute 
resolution. 
For example, just as companies may carve out particular types of 
disputes that carry a risk of high damages awards, they may also use a 
procedural carve-out for high-stakes claims by providing for expanded 
appeal rights in cases where an award meets or exceeds a particular dollar 
threshold.99  Additionally, companies use procedural carve-outs by 
engrafting litigation-like procedures for certain claims (like high-dollar 
claims), including procedures for expanded discovery and stricter rules of 
evidence.  In the business-to-business context, it is becoming more 
common for companies to opt for expanded discovery rather than limited 
discovery.  Studies of contemporary arbitration provisions indicate that 
“proceedings under standard arbitration rules are likely to include 
prehearing motion practice and extensive discovery” and that “[a]rbitration 
hearings are now often preceded by extensive discovery, including 
depositions.”100  Parties may also dictate that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
will apply to any arbitration proceedings.101 
 
 99  See, e.g., Sanchez v. Valencia Holdings Co., LLC, 353 P.3d 741 (Cal. 2015) 
(addressing this type of arbitration clause).  In addition, while courts traditionally review 
arbitration awards under a highly deferential standards, see 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018) (listing the 
limited grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award), some companies had provided 
that courts must review arbitration awards de novo and without the benefit of traditional 
deference.  Carroll E. Neesmann, Contracting for Judicial Review: Party-Chosen Arbitral 
Review Standards Can Inspire Confidence in the Process, and Is Good for Arbitration, 
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18–19 (1998).  The Supreme Court subsequently held, however, that the 
FAA prohibits parties from contracting for expanded judicial review or from changing the 
level of deference afforded to an arbitrator’s decision.  Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 100  Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 
6, 12 (2010).  See also Lawrence W. Newman, Agreements to Arbitrate and the 
Predictability of Procedures, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2009) (noting that business 
arbitration “has become more similar to litigation—particularly US-style litigation in United 
States courts—in large part because of increased procedural activity, including discovery”); 
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 
arbitration clause that stated: “In any such arbitration, the parties shall be entitled to 
discovery in the same manner as if the dispute was being litigated in Los Angeles Superior 
Court.”). 
 101  The American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) Dispute Resolution Service, for 
example, provides sample language for companies that wish to require arbitrators to follow 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See Guide to Arbitration Clauses, AHLA DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION SERVICE 7, https://www.healthlawyers.org/dr/Documents/Guide%20to%20Arb 
itration%20Clauses.pdf (last visited July 12, 2019) (“Sample language: The arbitrator will 
admit into evidence only documents and testimony that would be admissible under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.”).  See also John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses: 
Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, DISP. RESOL. J. 4 (Feb.–Apr. 2003) (describing arbitration 
clause that stated: “The arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules 
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These procedural carve-outs also reveal strong hostility to arbitration 
and reflect the belief that arbitration leads to less accurate and trustworthy 
decisions than litigation.  From the company’s perspective, a primary 
benefit of arbitration is reducing costs.  But it does so at the expense of 
accuracy.  “Narrow discovery rights and evidence rules tend to enable the 
parties to conserve dispute resolution costs at the expense of accuracy, 
while broader discovery rights and evidence rules increase the cost of 
dispute resolution but can increase accuracy.”102  Companies may choose to 
accept that cost reduction and ensuing loss of accuracy when the case is not 
important to them, but their priorities switch when the case is important.  
Consumers and employees, however, do not get to make this choice, as 
they lack the ability to bargain over the terms of the arbitration agreement 
that companies impose on them, and thus are often stuck with arbitration 
regardless of how important the case is to them.103 
Procedural carve-outs are not limited to high-dollar claims.  
Companies sometimes use carve-outs for small-dollar claims too.  As with 
debt-collection claims, companies may be more likely to carve out small-
dollar claims when the company is more likely to be the plaintiff than the 
defendant.  In the consumer financial services context, a common carve-out 
is one that permits either party to bring claims of $1,500 or less in small-
claims court rather than in arbitration.104  The CFPB found in its study that 
most of the arbitration clauses it reviewed contained a small-claims carve-
out.105  In several product markets, small-claims carve-outs were included 
in eighty to ninety-three percent of arbitration clauses.106  Interestingly, the 
CFPB found that corporations were much more likely to bring claims 
against consumers in small-claims court than consumers were to bring 
 
of Civil Procedure applicable in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, and the arbitrators shall follow the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
 102  Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1963.   
 103  Another explanation is that companies only would want to absorb the extra costs of 
discovery and evidentiary rules when the case has sufficient financial stakes to make those 
costs worthwhile. But even if that is true, it does not change the fact that companies find that 
importing litigation procedures helps promote accuracy, and that litigation procedures are 
superior to arbitration procedures for producing a correct outcome. 
 104  See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,835 n.71 (May 24, 2016) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. 1040) (“[M]ost arbitration agreements in consumer financial contracts contain a 
‘small claims court carve-out’ that provides the parties with a contractual right to pursue a 
claim in small claims court.”) (quoting CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at 33–
34)). 
 105  CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at § 1.4.6 (“Most arbitration clauses that 
we reviewed contained small claims court carve-outs”). 
 106  More specifically, 93% of payday loan arbitration clauses, 85% of mobile wireless 
arbitration clauses, 83% of private student loan arbitration clauses, 59% of checking account 
arbitration clauses, and 66.7% of credit card arbitration clauses contained small claims court 
carve-outs.  Id. § 2.5.2. 
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claims in small-claims court against companies.107  In the jurisdictions the 
agency examined, consumers brought 870 small-claims actions in 2012, 
while corporations brought 41,000 small-claims actions, almost all of 
which were debt collection actions.108 
The areas that Drahozal and O’Connor studied, with the exception of 
cell-phone service contracts, fell outside the consumer context, a context 
where standard-form, non-negotiable arbitration clauses are common.109  
But carve-outs are also common in the consumer and employment contexts.  
Business-to-consumer arbitration clauses might carve out claims related to 
debt collection,110 mortgage foreclosure and repossession,111 claims that are 
small enough to proceed in small-claims court,112 and claims for injunctive 
relief.113  In addition, in the consumer and employment contexts, 
corporations express a more troubling hostility to arbitration—by inserting 
terms that are designed to prevent consumers and employees from 
vindicating their rights in any forum, including arbitration.  These 
provisions are discussed below. 
B. Claim-Suppressing Arbitration Provisions 
Some arbitration clauses that appear to be expressing a preference for 
arbitration over litigation are in fact expressing a hostility to any form of 
dispute resolution at all.  The goal of these provisions is not to shift dispute 
resolution from court to arbitration but to prevent plaintiffs from 
vindicating their rights in any forum.  This occurs where companies choose 
arbitration because they can design their arbitration clauses in such a way 
to make it virtually impossible for an injured consumer or employee to 
bring a claim in arbitration.  If aggrieved parties are required to arbitrate, 
but the arbitration provision makes it infeasible for aggrieved individual to 
bring a claim, then corporate defendants are essentially unaccountable for 
their misconduct.  Professor David Schwartz describes these types of 
provisions as “claim-suppressing” arbitration provisions.114 
 
 107  See id. § 1.4.6 (revealing credit card issuers were “significantly more likely” to sue 
consumers than the other way around). 
 108  Id. 
 109  See, e.g., Szalai, supra note 8, at 236. (stating that “the use of arbitration clauses in 
non-negotiable, adhesionary contracts is widespread in American society” and that 
meaningful consent and choice “is often lacking in consumer arbitration agreements”).  
 110  See Ware, supra note 88, at 97. 
 111  See supra notes 88–89, and accompanying text. 
 112  See Ware, supra note 90, and accompanying text. 
 113  See, e.g., White v. ACell, Inc., 779 F. App’x 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 2019) (describing 
employment arbitration agreement that allowed the employer to bring certain claims for 
injunctive relief in court). 
 114  See David Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 
239, 240 (2012) (describing the current arbitration system as follows: “It is claim-
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The most high-profile example is an arbitration clause that prohibits 
parties from proceeding in a class action or other joint proceeding and 
instead requires individual arbitrations.  Class action bans are extremely 
prevalent in consumer contracts.115  While the company may appear to be 
signaling that it finds individual arbitration preferable to class litigation, 
often the class action bans are used because companies know that injured 
consumers will not bring individual claims in arbitration.116  For the types 
of high-volume, small-dollar injuries that companies often inflict on 
consumers, individual claims are not feasible, and a class action is the only 
way to ensure that those injuries can be redressed.117  Thus, courts have 
referred to arbitration clauses that ban class actions as “get out of jail free” 
cards for companies.118  These clauses do not reflect a preference for the 
arbitral forum.  Rather, they reflect an attempt to keep disputes out of any 
forum at all. 
Claim-suppressing carve-outs are not limited to class action bans.  
Companies have used arbitration clauses to prohibit individuals from 
bringing claims for public injunctions in any forum (either court or 
arbitration), and then have argued that the FAA preempts state-law rules 
requiring that such claims be available in some forum.119  Companies also 
 
suppressing arbitration. It is designed and intended to suppress claims, both in size and 
number.”).  
 115  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 116  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s study of arbitration clauses found that 
although tens of millions of consumers are subject to arbitration clauses with financial 
services companies, on average only 411 individual arbitrations were filed per year, and 
most of those involved higher-dollar claims that were feasible on an individual basis.  See 
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at § 1.4.3; see also Judith Resnik, Diffusing 
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of 
Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2804 (2015) (“The result has been the mass production of 
arbitration clauses without a mass of arbitrations.  Although hundreds of millions of 
consumers and employees are obliged to use arbitration as their remedy, almost none do so-
rendering arbitration not a vindication but an unconstitutional evisceration of statutory and 
common law rights.”). 
 117  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the 
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do 
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her 
rights.  A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential 
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”). 
 118  Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also 
Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the Arbitration 
Field Hearing, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance. 
gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-the-arbitratio 
n-field-hearing-20151007 (describing class-action bans as giving companies a “free pass”). 
 119  See, e.g., Alison Frankel, The 9th Circuit Just Blew up Mandatory Arbitration in 
Consumer Cases, REUTERS (July 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-
injunction/the-9th-circuit-just-blew-up-mandatory-arbitration-in-consumer-cases-
idUSKCN1TW3O0 (describing arguments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other 
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use more subtle methods to suppress claims.  Provisions that may appear to 
reflect an attempt to make dispute resolution faster or cheaper in reality 
may be attempting to suppress or limit claims altogether.  Such provisions 
include distant forums,120 shortened statute of limitations from a matter of 
years to a matter of weeks,121 loser-pays rules (where the losing party pays 
attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party),122 and limitations on 
awarding statutory or punitive damages.123  Those types of provisions 
either make it too difficult or risky for a consumer to bring a claim in 
arbitration, or they reduce the potential arbitration award to such a degree 
that the benefit of bringing a claim in arbitration is not worth the cost.  To 
be sure, courts have found unconscionable some of the most abusive 
examples of these provisions (at least outside the class-action context 
where the Supreme Court has indicated that class action bans can be 
enforced no matter how claim-suppressing they might be),124 
 
corporate groups that a California rule prohibiting arbitration clauses that ban plaintiffs from 
bringing public injunction actions in either court or arbitration is inconsistent with the 
FAA). 
 120  See, e.g., Willis v. Nationwide Debt Settlement Grp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1221 (D. 
Or. 2012) (provision requiring Oregon residents to travel to San Joaquin County, California, 
is unconscionable). 
 121  See, e.g., Zaborowski v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1153 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013) (arbitration clause set six-month statute of limitations); Samaniego v. Empire 
Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (arbitration clause set six-
month statute of limitations); Potiyevskiy v. TM Transp., Inc., No. 1-13-1864, 2013 IL App 
(1st) 131864-U, at *6, *8 (Ill. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (arbitration clause set ten-day statute 
of limitations); Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1197 (Wash. 2013) 
(arbitration clause reduced statute of limitations from several years to thirty days); Hill v.  
Garda CL Nw., Inc., 308 P.3d 635, 638 (Wash. 2013) (arbitration clause reduced statute of 
limitations to fourteen days). 
 122  See e.g., Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 F. App’x 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(arbitration clause contained “loser pays” provision); Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 
(arbitration “losers pays” provision); Winston v. Academi Training Ctr., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-
767, 2013 WL 989999, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2013) (refusing to enforce arbitration 
provision that required plaintiffs to pay all fees and costs even though the False Claims Act 
allows prevailing plaintiffs to collect attorney’s fees); Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 799–800 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (arbitration provision required 
employee to pay employer’s attorneys’ fees if employer prevailed, but did not require 
employer to pay employee’s fees if employee prevailed); Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., 
Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1200–01 (Wash. 2013) (striking down “loser pays” rule as 
unconscionable as applied to the plaintiff). 
 123  See, e.g., Newton, 549 F. App’x at 694 (arbitration clause precludes certain 
statutorily authorized damages); Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 (arbitration provision 
barred punitive damages); Ajamian, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 798–99 (arbitration provision 
precluded arbitrators from awarding special or punitive damages, but permitted the 
corporate party to recover liquidated damages on top of other damages); Franks v. Bowers, 
116 So. 3d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 2013) (arbitration clause precluded damages awardable under 
the state’s Medical Malpractice Act); Brown v. MHN Gov. Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 948, 955 
(Wash. 2013) (same). 
 124  See Frankel, supra note 39, at 242–49 (cataloging and discussing cases).  
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notwithstanding defendants’ arguments that the FAA preempts state 
unconscionability doctrine.  But these examples highlight that many 
companies use these provisions not because they like the arbitration 
process, but because these provisions can help them avoid being subjected 
to any dispute resolution process at all. 
Corporations’ use of anti-severability provisions in conjunction with 
claim-suppressing provisions like class action bans reveal another layer of 
corporate hostility to arbitration.  While some arbitration provisions include 
severability clauses—clauses that state that if one portion of the arbitration 
clause is declared unenforceable, the rest of the clause will remain valid 
and binding125—it also is common for companies to use an anti-severability 
clause.  These clauses state that if a particular aspect of the arbitration 
provision is invalidated, the entire arbitration clause shall be eliminated, 
and parties will be free to bring any disputes in court. 
Anti-severability clauses are quite revealing and indicate that, as a 
general matter, companies find arbitration inferior to litigation.  When a 
company drafts an arbitration clause and inserts it into its contracts, the 
company is not saying that arbitration is preferable to litigation without 
qualification.  It is saying that it finds arbitration superior under the specific 
conditions and limitations that it has written into its arbitration provision.  
An anti-severability clause shows that if a court were to declare one or 
more of those conditions invalid or unenforceable, the drafting party no 
longer considers arbitration to be superior to litigation and would prefer to 
use the court system. 
Anti-severability provisions are common and often are used in 
conjunction with a class action ban.126  For example, in the recent Supreme 
Court case of DIRECTV v. Imburgia,127 DIRECTV’s arbitration clause 
stated that if the class action ban were to be found unenforceable, then the 
entire arbitration clause would become unenforceable.128  Through this 
 
 125  See, e.g., Citi 2017 Employment Arbitration Policy at 67, para. 28 (on file with 
author) (“If any part or provision of this Policy is held to be invalid, illegal or 
unenforceable, such holding won’t affect the legality, validity or enforceability of the 
remaining parts and each provision of this Policy will be valid, legal and enforceable to the 
fullest extent permitted by law.”).  
 126  CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 45, at § 1.4.1 (finding that many of the 
arbitration clauses used in consumer financial services contracts included an anti-
severability provision in conjunction with a class action ban); Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, 
supra note 97, at 884–85 (finding that 60% of class action waivers in consumer arbitration 
clauses that the author studied contained an anti-severability provision). 
 127  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
 128  Id. at 469–71 (describing and interpreting an anti-severability clause used by 
DIRECTV which stated, in relevant part, “‘[i]f . . . the law of your state would find this 
agreement to dispense with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this [arbitration 
provision] is unenforceable’”); see also JP Morgan Chase NA Arbitration Agreement (2019) 
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provision, DIRECTV expressed a hostility to any mandatory arbitration—
individualized or joint—unless the arbitration clause contained a class 
action ban.  The reason that anti-severability clauses are so common is that 
many corporations are fearful of, and hostile to, class arbitration.  In fact, 
corporations have been quite clear that while they dislike class actions, they 
dislike class arbitration even more.  Companies find that class litigation, 
with its procedural formalities and appellate rights, is far superior to class 
arbitration for protecting their rights.  The United States Chamber of 
Commerce has described class arbitration as follows: “Class arbitration is a 
worst-of-all-worlds Frankenstein’s monster: It combines the enormous 
stakes, formality and expense of litigation that are inimical to bilateral 
arbitration with exceedingly limited judicial review of the arbitrators’ 
decisions.”129  Stating that class actions, if allowed, must proceed in court 
rather than arbitration is consistent with the corporate preference for 
carving out “bet the company” cases. 
Moreover, this type of anti-severability clause, while ostensibly 
indicating a hostility only to class arbitration, actually evinces hostility to 
all mandatory arbitration, both joint and individual.  The anti-severability 
provision does not say that if the class action ban is declared unenforceable, 
then all class proceedings can proceed in court while individual cases will 
be sent to arbitration.  It eliminates mandatory arbitration for all claims.  
Indeed, corporate organizations have been quite frank in stating that if they 
could not impose a class action ban as a condition of arbitration, they 
would walk away from arbitration entirely, including arbitration of 
individual claims.130  The breadth of their statements, and of the anti-
severability provisions that companies like DIRECTV use, suggests that 
companies never wanted their disputes to be resolved in arbitration.  
Rather, companies use arbitration to eliminate any dispute resolution at all. 
C. Current Litigation Regarding Carve-Outs 
Although carve-outs are sometimes discussed in litigation, courts have 
not addressed carve-outs in terms of determining what is an appropriate or 
 
(on file with author) (“If these terms prohibiting class, representative, or consolidation 
procedures are held to be legally unenforceable for any reason with respect to a Claim, then 
the Claim must be handled through litigation in court instead of by arbitration.”). 
 129  Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellants at 9, Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. v. Sterman, No. 15-
10627 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2015). 
 130  See, e.g., Richard Frankel, “What We Lose in Sales We Make Up in Volume”: The 
Faulty Logic of the Financial Services Industry’s Response to the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s Proposed Rule Prohibiting Class Action Bans in Arbitration Clauses, 
48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 283, 296 (2016) (documenting how businesses have said they would 
abandon arbitration if they could not ban class actions). 
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inappropriate level of hostility to arbitration for purposes of FAA 
preemption.  When courts have addressed carve-outs, they generally have 
indicated that it is entirely acceptable for private parties to express hostility 
to arbitration, or to express the view that arbitration is inferior to litigation, 
by using carve-outs. 
Carve-outs are sometimes discussed in determining whether a 
particular dispute falls within the carve-out and is not subject to 
arbitration,131 or in determining whether an arbitration clause should be 
given a broad or a narrow interpretation.132  Some parties also have argued 
that arbitration clauses with extremely broad carve-outs that give one party 
the right to bring any claim in court lack consideration because they do not 
place any obligation on that party.  Courts have differed about whether an 
arbitration clause becomes unenforceable in that circumstance.133 
Carve-outs also can be relevant to challenges to an arbitration clause’s 
enforceability.  Some parties have argued, and courts have gone in different 
directions, that “non-mutual” arbitration clauses are unconscionably one-
sided if they allow the drafting party to bring most of the claims it would 
want to pursue in court while binding the other side to arbitration for the 
claims that party is most likely to pursue.134  But even in this context, 
courts acknowledge that it is perfectly legitimate for a party to express 
hostility to arbitration.  In fact, courts are less likely to find a non-mutual 
arbitration clause unconscionable if a party provides a business justification 
for the carve-out.135  Ironically, in this context, expressing hostility to 
 
 131  See, e.g., FT & T Consulting Inc. v. Cargowise EDI Inc., No. 09 C 1141, 2009 WL 
1904415, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2009) (finding claims not arbitrable when the arbitration 
clause specifically excluded disputes relating to performance obligations); Rebolledo v. 
Tilly’s, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 612, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (arbitration clause that 
excluded claims falling within jurisdiction of State Labor Commissioner excluded all 
statutory wage claims that could be brought in an administrative proceeding before Labor 
Commissioner, regardless of whether claim was actually brought). 
 132  See, e.g., Local 827, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 458 
F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (interpreting arbitration clause in collective bargaining 
agreement narrowly when the clause referred to five specific types of disputes to be 
arbitrated); Simon v. Pfizer, Inc., 398 F.3d 765, 775–76 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that if 
arbitration clause is limited to specific statutory claims it should not be interpreted to extend 
broadly to other statutory claims). 
 133  See BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, § 5.3.1 (discussing this issue and citing cases). 
 134  See BLAND ET AL., supra note 45, § 6.7.3 (discussing the issue of whether non-
mutual arbitration clauses are unconscionable and citing cases). 
 135  See, e.g., Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(finding that carve-out for intellectual property claims was not unconscionable because the 
defendant had a “legitimate business need” for the “extra margin of safety” that litigation 
provides); Delmore v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(finding that arbitration agreement that carved-out claims for injunctive relief for breaches 
of confidentiality was not unconscionable because courts are superior to arbitrators in 
addressing claims for injunctive relief); Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 
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arbitration, or explaining why some disputes are better addressed in 
litigation, makes the arbitration clause stronger and more impervious to 
challenges to its enforceability. 
In other cases, courts have recognized that arbitration is inferior to 
litigation for certain claims,136 and, paradoxically, have used that to justify 
FAA preemption of a rule allowing such claim to proceed in arbitration.  
Most notably, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court relied 
on corporate arguments about why arbitration is inferior to litigation for 
class proceedings to justify the use of class action bans and also to prohibit 
states from adopting laws that would place arbitration and litigation on 
equal footing with respect to class proceedings.137  In other words, with 
respect to class proceedings, the Court required states to adopt a hostility to 
arbitration and forbade them from treating the two equally.  Specifically, in 
finding that the FAA preempted a California judicial rule finding it 
unconscionable to use class action bans in arbitration clauses when applied 
to small-dollar claims, the Court applied some of the same reasoning that 
companies have used when writing carve-outs.  The Court determined that 
arbitration was so “poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” in 
significant part because class actions involve greater risks to defendants, 
which would be unlikely to agree to bet the company, especially given the 
limited appellate review of arbitrator decisions.138 
There, the Court concluded that arbitration is inferior to litigation for 
class proceedings, and that such hostility to arbitration apparently is 
acceptable and does not violate the FAA.  Ordinarily that would mean that 
such claims can be brought in court, much in the way that carve-outs 
 
862, 872 (D. Or. 2002) (finding that foreclosure claims “are heavily regulated by statute, 
allowing for streamlined procedures and effective protections for both sides,” and thus it is 
not “unreasonable, much less oppressive, to forego arbitration of such claims”); Salley v. 
Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 128 (Pa. 2007) (finding that a carve-out for 
foreclosure remedies was not unconscionable because “there are sound pragmatic and policy 
reasons why foreclosure proceedings should be pursued in a court of law”). 
 136  See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (recognizing 
that agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims are enforceable even if they do not 
appear to be “appropriate for arbitration”); Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 
F.3d 425, 437 (9th Cir. 2015) (“By their nature, some types of claims are better suited to 
arbitration than others.”).  
 137  563 U.S. 333, 348–51 (2011). 
 138  Id. at 350–51; accord Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 
686–87 (2010) (expressing similar concerns about how class procedures may cause 
“fundamental changes” to the nature of arbitration).  Buoyed by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Concepcion, corporate parties have tried to extend that reasoning to bar 
consumers from bringing claims for public injunctive relief, either in court or in arbitration, 
on the ground that claims for public injunctions are incompatible with arbitration.  See, e.g., 
Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendants-Appellants, McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 772 F. App’x 575 
(9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-17246). 
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preserve claims for court.  The Court, however, concluded that California 
could not require class claims to be brought in court, but must enforce an 
arbitration clause banning any type of class proceeding whatsoever.  
Although Concepcion seems to be an unabashedly pro-business, pro-
arbitration decision, it is interesting that Concepcion also implicitly 
recognizes that it is acceptable for a public body such as a court to express 
some hostility to arbitration. 
While courts have addressed carve-outs in these contexts, they have 
not addressed carve-outs in considering whether they signal some level of 
hostility to arbitration.  Nor have they considered whether the hostility 
evidenced by carve-outs should have any bearing on the scope and reach of 
FAA preemption.  That question is discussed in the next section. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE HOSTILITY TO ARBITRATION 
The idea that entities believe that arbitration might be preferable to 
litigation for some disputes but not for others is hardly surprising.  No one 
reasonably contends that the question of arbitration versus litigation is all 
or nothing, in the sense that arbitration is either always superior to litigation 
or that it is always inferior to litigation.139  It naturally will be the case that 
arbitration might be better suited for some disputes than others.140 
Yet, scholars have not examined the parallels between corporate 
hostility to arbitration that is permitted by contract, and the judicial and 
legislative hostility to arbitration that is preempted by the FAA.  Nor have 
they examined whether a private party’s value judgments about when 
arbitration is inferior to litigation should affect whether the FAA permits 
state legislatures and courts to enact laws or apply common-law doctrines 
that reflect similar judgments about the value of arbitration vis-à-vis 
litigation. This section explores those questions.  First, it draws parallels 
between the reasoning companies use for carving out specific claims, and 
the reasoning that states use when adopting various regulations of 
arbitration that are preempted by the FAA.  It draws out the dissonance that 
results in prohibiting states from expressing hostility to arbitration while 
 
 139  The exception might be if arbitration were truly viewed as a veiled attempt at claim 
suppression rather than as a mechanism for actual dispute resolution.  If arbitration is a 
venue where all claims go to die, as some might reasonably argue, then one might be able to 
say that arbitration is always inferior to litigation.  See, e.g., Arbitration in America: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm of the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 16 (Apr. 2, 2019) (testimony of 
Myriam Gilles) (“The one and only objective of forced, pre-dispute, class-banning 
arbitration clauses is to suppress and bury claims.”). 
 140  See, e.g., Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1992 (“Given that contractual 
relationships tend to involve multiple but differing performance risks, it is not surprising 
that parties might prefer to use courts to address some of those risks but arbitration to 
address others.”). 
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celebrating the right of corporations to do so.  Second, this section suggests 
that this dissonance is troubling given that companies use carve-outs to 
maximize their self-interest at the expense of their potential adversaries.  
Third, it suggests that allowing corporations with significant bargaining 
power to use carve-outs to promote their private interest while prohibiting 
states from regulating arbitration to promote the public interest is anti-
democratic and that this distinction should be revisited. 
A. Corporate Hostility to Arbitration Parallels State Legislative and 
Judicial Hostility to Arbitration 
There are strong parallels between corporate hostility to arbitration as 
expressed in carve-outs, and state judicial and legislative hostility to 
arbitration that is prohibited by the doctrine of FAA preemption.  That 
makes sense, because both corporate carve-outs and state regulation of 
arbitration reflect similar value judgments about the relative strengths of 
arbitration versus litigation. 
The dichotomy between the two arises because while corporations 
necessarily make a value judgment as to the relative merits of arbitration 
versus litigation when they draft their arbitration provisions, state 
legislatures and state courts are prohibited from making those same value 
judgments in seeking to protect the state’s citizens.  When a corporation 
carves out particular disputes or disputes with particular parties from an 
arbitration clause on the theory that arbitration is ill-suited to address them, 
that is celebrated as an exercise of contractual freedom.141  But if a 
legislature were to decide that a certain type of dispute was ill suited for 
arbitration and therefore must proceed in court, that legislation would be 
preempted by the FAA under its current interpretation.142 
This dichotomy deserves closer scrutiny, as there are numerous 
examples where corporate hostility to arbitration as reflected in carve-outs 
is virtually no different than state legislative or judicial rules that 
corporations have argued are preempted as hostile to arbitration.  
Corporations like to keep claims for injunctive relief in court because they 
view courts as better suited to provide injunctive relief.143  But when the 
California Supreme Court decided that claims for public injunctive relief 
should not be resolved in arbitration because of those very same 
limitations,144 the Ninth Circuit held that California’s rule was preempted 
because it reflected an assumption that arbitrators were inferior to judges in 
 
 141  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 142  See supra Part II. 
 143  See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 144  See Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003); Broughton v. 
Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999). 
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awarding injunctive relief.145  And the argument that the FAA preempted 
California’s rule was made by business interests, including the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and the American Bankers Association, both of 
which appeared as amicus curiae to argue in support of preemption.146  
Furthermore, corporations have taken their argument one step further, 
arguing that a California law requiring that public injunction claims be 
allowable in some forum, either court or arbitration, is preempted by the 
FAA, even though such a law treats litigation and arbitration equally.147 
Similarly, just as many contracts carve out repossession actions from 
arbitration, because of the need for emergency relief and the necessity of 
various judicial procedures, some states prohibit repossession claims from 
being resolved in arbitration.148  Those laws are almost certainly preempted 
by the FAA, which forbids declaring a particular type of action non-
arbitrable.149 
The same is true for procedural carve-outs.  While companies may 
prefer to avoid arbitration for cases they consider to be high stakes,150 or 
they may prefer to import litigation-like procedures such as expanded 
discovery and appeal rights,151 legislatures and courts cannot adopt similar 
 
 145  See Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2013); Kilgore v. 
KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 146  See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants on Rehearing En Banc, Kilgore v. KeyBank, 
Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-16703) (en banc); Kilgore, 718 F.3d at 
1055 (listing amicus curiae brief filed by the American Bankers Association, among others). 
 147  See Blair v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 827–31 (9th Cir. 2019); see also 
Frankel, supra note 119 (describing arguments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
other corporate groups that a California rule prohibiting arbitration clauses that ban 
plaintiffs from bringing public injunction actions in either court or arbitration is inconsistent 
with the FAA).  
 148  See, e.g., PA. R. CIV. P. 1301 and explanatory comment (exempting foreclosure 
claims from the state’s compulsory judicial arbitration process on the ground that 
foreclosure proceedings are not “not appropriate” for arbitration); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.5035 (forbidding arbitration of fee disputes in land such as quiet title actions), 
repealed by 2011 Mich. Legis. Serv. 902 (eff. July 1, 2013).  Until recently, a state law 
prohibiting arbitration of foreclosure actions would have been preempted.  The Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010, however, amended the FAA to prohibit inserting mandatory arbitration 
provisions into mortgage contracts.  15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1) (2018).  Presumably, a 
company could still require a consumer to arbitrate a foreclosure action as long as the 
arbitration provision was part of a different contract and not part of the mortgage loan.  
Additionally, one district court has held that this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
apply to arbitration clauses in mortgage loans that were executed prior to Dodd-Frank’s 
enactment.  See Weller v. HSBC Mortgage Servs., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1077–79 (D. 
Colo. 2013). 
 149  AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011) (“When state law 
prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: 
The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”).  
 150  See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
 151  See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
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rules.  The FAA would surely preempt a law stating that all claims over a 
certain threshold dollar amount must be brought in court.152  Likewise, the 
FAA would preempt a rule that did not forbid arbitration of high-stakes 
claims, but simply required that such claims provide for expanded 
discovery or appellate review.153 
If a state tried to carve out claims that are “high stakes” for the 
plaintiff but not necessarily for the corporate defendant, such laws likely 
would be preempted.  For example, as the #MeToo movement sheds 
greater light on sexual harassment in the workplace, the ability to litigate 
sexual harassment claims or bring them to public light has taken on great 
importance.  There is increased recognition that requiring arbitration of 
such claims can keep them in secret and allow serial harassers to continue 
their illegal conduct.154  Yet, when New York’s state legislature recently 
tried to forbid mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims, that law 
was struck down as preempted.155 
As explained above, parties carve out claims, such as debt collection 
claims, where they think the law is clear and where they worry that 
arbitrators are less likely than judges to follow the law.156  But a law that 
makes debt-collection claims non-arbitrable, or any other law that tries to 
distinguish between claims that arbitrators are better suited to handle from 
ones they are less well-suited to handle, would be preempted.  Parties 
exhibit a hostility to arbitration as a plaintiff by carving out claims in ways 
that ensure that they can litigate claims in court where they will be the 
plaintiff but that any claim where they will be a defendant will be subject to 
 
 152  See Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 437–38 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(suggesting that parties can choose to litigate high-stakes claims but not that states could 
require parties to litigate high-stakes claims). 
 153  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341–42 (stating that a law requiring judicially monitored 
discovery in arbitration would be preempted).  The one place where there may be parity 
between corporate hostility and public hostility is in the area of appellate review.  That is 
because the Supreme Court has indicated that both contracting parties and legislators or 
judges are prohibited from providing for expanded appellate review of an arbitrator’s 
decision.  See supra note 99. 
 154  See, e.g., Hope Reese, Gretchen Carlson on How Forced Arbitration Allows 
Companies to Protect Harassers, VOX (May 21, 2018), https://www.vox.com/conversations 
/2018/4/30/17292482/gretchen-carlson-me-too-sexual-harassment-supreme-court (describing 
how Gretchen Carlson and other victims of sexual harassment have argued that requiring 
arbitration of sexual harassments claims keeps allegations secret and allows harassment to 
continue, and describing how advocates have urged Congress to enact legislation to restrict 
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims). 
 155  See Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, No. 18cv11528 (DLC), 2019 WL 2610985 
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019) (finding that FAA preempted New York statute forbidding 
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims).  
 156  See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
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mandatory arbitration.157  One way to address this hostility would be to 
enact a law giving the plaintiff the option of proceeding in court or in 
arbitration.  That too, would be preempted. 
State laws that attempt to mirror the anti-severability provisions of 
many corporate arbitration clauses also face preemption challenges.  Courts 
have occasionally addressed anti-severability principles in the context of 
addressing unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses.  
Specifically, when a provision in an arbitration clause is struck down as 
unconscionable, the court must decide whether to sever the unconscionable 
provision and enforce the remainder of the arbitration clause, or whether to 
strike down the entire arbitration clause.  Some courts have applied an anti-
severability principle in certain circumstances, holding that if an arbitration 
clause is permeated with unfairness, the entire provision should be struck 
down because the enforceable portions cannot be separated from the 
unenforceable ones.158  Corporations have pushed forward the argument 
that the courts’ application of anti-severability principles is preempted, 
because courts purportedly refuse to sever unconscionable arbitration 
provisions more often than they refuse to sever unconscionable provisions 
from other contracts.159  While corporations have written anti-severability 
provisions into their arbitration clauses, they have simultaneously tried to 
invalidate judicial anti-severability rules as preempted by the FAA.  In 
short, state governments seek to carve out claims or procedures from 
arbitration for many of the same reasons that corporations carve out claims.  
Yet, corporations are permitted to implement these carve outs while states 
are not. 
B. Corporate Carve-outs Maximize Self-Interest 
This dichotomy between prohibiting states from expressing hostility 
to arbitration while allowing corporations to do so is troubling given that 
corporations likely use carve-outs because they want to maximize their 
self-interest.  It stands to reason that when parties express hostility to 
arbitration through the use of carve-outs, they do so because they believe 
that such hostility is advantageous to them.  While no single carve-out is 
universally used, carve-outs reveal a flaw in the Supreme Court’s 
 
 157  See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 158  See, e.g., Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 501 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2012).  
 159  See, e.g., Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. Zaborowski, 136 S. Ct. 
1539 (2016) (No. 14-1458) (arguing that the FAA preempts California’s state-law rule about 
when an unenforceable portion of an arbitration clause can or cannot be severed from the 
rest of the agreement); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28–34, Winston & Strawn, LLC v. 
Ramos, No. 18-1437 (U.S. May 14, 2019) (same). 
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articulation of how the FAA preempts any rule that reflects hostility to 
arbitration.  As previously explained, the Court has assumed that any state 
law must assume that arbitration is just as good or better than litigation for 
both parties involved in order to comply with the FAA. 
But a company’s decision to use an arbitration clause (or to designate 
certain claims for arbitration and carve out others for litigation) signifies its 
belief that arbitration is a superior alternative for the company and also an 
inferior alternative for the company’s potential adversary.  Indeed, 
companies’ selective use of carve-outs—and particularly companies’ use of 
carve-outs to distinguish between claims where the company will be a 
plaintiff and those where it will be a defendant—shows that companies use 
arbitration when they think it gives them an advantage over their adversary, 
and that they use litigation when they think litigation is more advantageous.  
Arbitration clauses are about dispute resolution, and dispute resolution is 
inherently adversarial.  Thus, a party’s choice about its dispute resolution 
system likely reflects its attempt to maximize its advantage relative to its 
potential opposing parties.160  In other words, even a decision to use 
arbitration in the first place, with or without carve-outs, may be based on an 
assumption that arbitration is an inferior alternative for some party to the 
agreement.  Accordingly, hostility to arbitration may be embedded in 
virtually any decision a company makes about arbitration, because every 
decision reflects a value judgment about the relative merits of arbitration 
versus litigation. 
There are several reasons to think that carve-outs, particularly those 
appearing in non-negotiable adhesion contracts between companies and 
their customers or employees, are designed to advantage corporate 
defendants at the expense of individual plaintiffs.  First, the claim-
suppressing arbitration clauses described earlier are used to protect 
defendants from accountability by making it difficult or impossible for 
individuals to vindicate their rights.  Second, the differential use of 
arbitration when companies are likely to be plaintiffs rather than defendants 
shows that companies may see arbitration as systematically favoring 
defendants. 
Third, the way corporations carve out particular contractual 
relationships from arbitration, as opposed to particular types of disputes, 
reinforces that many companies do not see arbitration as a superior forum 
 
 160  That is not necessarily true in all circumstances, as a company might choose 
arbitration because it thinks that it will benefit from potential cost savings regardless of how 
it fares in particular disputes, or because it thinks it will get speedier resolution even if it 
loses more disputes that it would otherwise lose.  Cf. Hylton, supra note 87, at 213 
(hypothesizing that parties will use arbitration when the costs of litigation outweigh its 
benefits).  
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for addressing disputes, but instead as a way of suppressing those disputes.  
One study examined arbitration clauses used by publicly traded consumer 
finance and telecommunication companies and compared their contracts 
with other companies to the contracts they used with consumers.161  They 
found that companies used arbitration clauses in consumer contracts at a 
much higher rate than they did in their business-to-business contracts.162  
Notably, the arbitration clauses in the consumer contracts all had class 
action bans, while almost none of the business-to-business contracts 
contained a class action ban.163 
As to this latter reason, one possible explanation is that the types of 
disputes likely to arise in the business-to-business context are better suited 
to litigation, while the business-to-consumer disputes are better suited (in 
the corporate party’s view) to arbitration.164  But that seems unlikely, for 
several reasons.  First, many consumer disputes involve disputes over 
credit and loans, and illegal and deceptive practices that relate to those 
loans.  Lending and credit is one of the subject matters that is most often 
carved out of arbitration clauses and reserved for litigation in the business-
to-business context.165  It stands to reason that if litigation offers 
advantages over arbitration for debt collection in the business-to-business 
context, it should also offer advantages in the business-to-consumer 
context.  Second, several corporate organizations have expressed that they 
prefer to operate under a single dispute resolution system rather than under 
two different dispute resolution systems.  It is allegedly more costly and 
more complicated for a company to face some disputes in litigation and 
others in arbitration.166  But if that is true, then companies should not prefer 
to arbitrate with some parties and litigate with others.  They should prefer 
to entirely litigate or entirely arbitrate.  The fact that companies 
differentiate between parties suggests that where they use arbitration 
clauses, they are doing so because they think it will stop disputes from 
being resolved, thus avoiding arbitration altogether, and not because they 
would rather arbitrate consumer claims and litigate business-to-business 
claims. 
 
 161  Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 97, at 880–81.  
 162  Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 97, at 876 (finding that over 75% of 
consumer contracts required arbitration while less than 10% of business-to-business 
contracts required arbitration). 
 163  Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 97, at 884 (finding that every arbitration 
clause in a consumer contract contained a class action ban). 
 164  See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 73, at 457–67.  
 165  See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text. 
 166  Frankel, supra note 130, at 297 (explaining how some business organizations and 
commentators “have suggested it is too expensive for companies to deal with two different 
dispute resolution systems–judicial and arbitration”).  
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Additionally, it is notable that carve-outs appear more often where 
there is greater disparity in bargaining power between the parties and less 
opportunity for negotiation.167  Unsurprisingly, these “carve-outs often 
seem to benefit one party to the agreement.”168  This also suggests that 
carve-outs are not used only in situations where both parties can freely 
negotiate and jointly decide that litigation is preferable to arbitration.  
Rather, it appears more likely that carve-outs are forced on the weaker 
party by the stronger party in order to maximize the stronger party’s 
advantage in any dispute.  In other words, carve-outs are simply a reminder 
that the drafting party chooses arbitration where it thinks that arbitration 
will benefit the corporation, and chooses litigation where it thinks that 
arbitration is inferior to litigation for protecting its private interest. 
C. Subverting Democratic Accountability 
This paper has attempted to show that parties (and, in particular, 
corporate parties) are expressing the same hostility to arbitration through 
contract that the Supreme Court has held that states are precluded from 
expressing through legislation and judicial decision-making.  This 
dichotomy is troubling.  It is not self-evident that the former should be 
permitted while the latter is prohibited.  After all, if one purpose of the 
FAA is to eradicate hostility to arbitration, then the FAA should not 
distinguish between corporate hostility to arbitration and legislative or 
judicial hostility to arbitration.  If corporations are allowed to indulge 
certain assumptions about the limitations and flaws of arbitration when 
they design their arbitration clauses, then it would seem equally appropriate 
for state governments to adopt those same assumptions when seeking to 
regulate arbitration. 
Although existing arbitration doctrine provides an explanation for this 
disparate treatment, that explanation lacks force in a world of boilerplate, 
non-negotiable adhesion contracts.  Current doctrine describes arbitration 
as being a matter of private choice.  The Court has said that “arbitration 
under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion,”169 that the FAA 
embodies the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of 
contract,”170 and that courts must enforce arbitration clauses “according to 
their terms.”171  If the fundamental difference between arbitration and 
 
 167  Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1968 (finding that “[i]f that party has 
substantial bargaining power in the drafting of the contract, carve-outs will appear at very 
high rates”). 
 168  Id. 
 169  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 479 (1989). 
 170  Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). 
 171  Volt, 489 U.S. at 478; AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347 n.6 
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litigation is choice—that in arbitration the parties can choose how they 
design their dispute resolution process, whereas in court they cannot—then 
contractual hostility is acceptable even if legislative hostility is not.172 
Accordingly, current doctrine allows corporations to express as much 
or as little hostility to arbitration as they wish, by giving corporations wide 
latitude to design arbitration clauses in any way, subject only to the 
limitation that they cannot violate general principles that apply to all 
contracts.173  And this gives corporate parties significant power to write 
their arbitration provision in the most self-interested manner possible, 
while arguing that any attempt by the state to rein in their behavior is 
preempted.  Current doctrine gives corporate parties a powerful weapon to 
say that their arbitration clauses must be enforced at all costs, even if they 
are one-sided, because the FAA requires arbitration clauses to be enforced 
“according to their terms.”174  Parties can choose to adopt limitations on 
their arbitration clauses based on hostility to arbitration, but those 
limitations cannot be forced upon them by state law.  Parties can contract 
for expanded discovery in arbitration, but they cannot be required to allow 
for expanded discovery;175 parties can agree to place their arbitration clause 
in bold type at the top of the contract, but they cannot be forced to do so; 
parties can agree to allow class actions in court or in litigation, but they 
cannot be forced by a state to allow class actions.176 
This logic rests on the assumption that voluntary, bargained-for 
hostility to arbitration is acceptable because it reflects the will of the parties 
and is based on choice.  By contrast, state regulation of arbitration that 
arises out of a suspicion that arbitration may be unfair or less favorable 
than litigation in certain circumstances is coercive and limits the parties’ 
freedom to design their arbitration clauses as they see fit. 
That distinction may resonate in a world of bargained-for, arm’s-
 
(2011); see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018) (authorizing federal courts to order arbitration “in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement”). 
 172  See, e.g., Chorley Enters. Inc. v. Dickey’s Barbecue Rests., Inc., 807 F.3d 553, 570–
71 (4th Cir. 2015) (“FAA preemption prevents states from carving out wholesale exceptions 
to arbitration.  It does not prevent private parties from agreeing to litigate, rather than 
arbitrate, specific claims.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 173  See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (making arbitration clauses enforceable “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). 
 174  Volt, 489 U.S. at 478; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347 n.6; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 
(authorizing federal courts to order arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement”). 
 175  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351 (stating that parties can voluntarily agree to judicially 
enforceable discovery but that such a rule cannot be imposed on them).  
 176  See id. at 351 (stating that parties could agree to allow class arbitrations, but they 
cannot be required by the state to do so, because “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract, and 
the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations”). 
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length contracts between two parties with similar bargaining power and 
similar knowledge of the benefits and drawbacks of arbitration.  Perhaps 
that world exists for some business-to-business contracts where the parties 
have the power to negotiate over the specific terms of an arbitration clause.  
But that world is a fantasy in the realm of boilerplate adhesion contracts 
that dominate consumer and employment relationships.  Virtually all 
consumer contracts are non-negotiable contracts entered into between 
individual consumers and large corporations.177  The Supreme Court has 
frankly acknowledged that “the times in which consumer contracts were 
anything other than adhesive are long past.”178  The notion that arbitration 
clauses are voluntarily agreed to and reflect deliberate choice by the parties 
is illusory.179  Instead, they arise in transactions were the consumer lacks 
bargaining power, and where there is a vast informational asymmetry 
between the consumer and the corporation about the significance and the 
effect of the arbitration clause.180 
From the consumer’s perspective, the arbitration clause imposed by a 
corporation as part of a non-negotiable adhesion contract is just as 
involuntary as a rule imposed by a court or a legislature.  There is little 
difference between a corporation unilaterally dictating that certain claims 
cannot be arbitrated because they are better suited for courts (such as class 
actions, debt collection, and injunctive relief) and a legislature dictating 
that those claims cannot be arbitrated because they are better suited for 
courts.  For the consumer, the corporation is as powerful as the state.181  
 
 177  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 178  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346–47. 
 179  See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 86–90 (2013) (questioning whether that the rise of modern boilerplate 
adhesion contracts is consistent with traditional notions of contractual consent); Brian Bix, 
Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 251 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 
2010) (concluding that the notion of consent, as “expressed by the ideal of ‘freedom of 
contract,’” is effectively “absent in the vast majority of contracts we enter into these days,” 
though also concluding that this lack of meaningful assent is not problematic). 
 180  Indeed, some studies have shown that consumers are often not aware that the 
contracts they sign contain an arbitration clause, or if they are, they do not understand what 
it means or its significance.  See generally Sovern, supra note 8. 
 181  Courts have also, and perhaps unwittingly, reinforced this narrative that arbitration 
clauses simply represent the corporate defendant’s interest rather than the mutual agreement 
of the parties.  When applying the FAA or interpreting arbitration clauses, courts have 
focused on what the corporate defendant’s expectations are and have ignored what the 
consumer would have wanted, tacitly acknowledging that the consumer has no bargaining 
power and the consumer’s interest is therefore irrelevant.  In Concepcion, when describing 
why AT&T Mobility carved out class proceedings from its arbitration clause, the Supreme 
Court noted that “class arbitration increases risks to defendants” and concluded, “[w]e find 
it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of 
review.”  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350–51.  Noticeably absent is any discussion of what the 
consumer-plaintiffs would have wanted, or why they would have agreed to a class action 
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Neither situation is voluntary, and both are equally coercive. 
In fact, in the adhesion world of consumer contracts, it is more 
troubling to give corporations the authority to determine when arbitration is 
flawed or inferior to court than it is to give authority to state legislatures 
and courts—yet that is exactly what the FAA does.  Corporations act to 
maximize their own self-interest.  Legislatures and courts are 
democratically accountable and are supposed to act to protect the public at 
large.182  That means that corporations have full license to express hostility 
to arbitration when doing so works to their advantage.  And it appears that 
is exactly how corporations use carve-outs: to maximize their own 
advantage, suppress claims by injured consumers and employees, and 
insulate themselves from accountability. 
It would make more sense to give legislatures and courts acting in the 
interests of their citizenry an equal power to adopt carve-outs from 
arbitration or to regulate arbitration in order to promote fairness.  Giving 
states this power would not necessarily cause undue harm to companies 
that currently use arbitration clauses.  It is important to recognize that 
legislatures do not just speak for consumers, but for all constituents, 
including corporate constituents.183  Thus, corporations would still have 
plenty of voice through the legislative process, especially given the money 
that they can bring to bear on campaigning and lobbying efforts.  Whereas 
current doctrine gives the corporation unilateral power to express hostility 
to arbitration, a doctrine that gives the legislature equivalent power to 
express hostility through regulation would likely achieve fairer results.  If 
corporations can avoid the problematic aspects of arbitration by contract, 
then legislatures also should be able to protect their constituents against the 
problematic aspects of arbitration by statute and regulation. 
Thus, current doctrine seems to get everything backwards.  The 
corporation, the party acting in its own self-interest, can express any 
 
ban that deprives them of any meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights.  Courts have 
done this in other arbitration contexts as well, such as whether a corporation’s agents can 
enforce an arbitration clause even though they did not sign it.  In one case, the Texas 
Supreme Court held, “When contracting parties agree to arbitrate all disputes ‘under or with 
respect to’ a contract (as they did here), they generally intend to include disputes about their 
agents’ actions . . . .”  In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2006).  
Although the court stated that the parties intend to include disputes involving “their” agents, 
typically only corporate parties have agents.  Individuals and consumers often do not. 
 182  See RADIN, supra note 179, at 94 (“The laws of the state are supposedly established 
in the public interest and not in the private interest of a particular firm.  Boilerplate schemes 
by their nature are in the interest of a firm and its market strategy and profits.”). 
 183  See, e.g., Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball Disguised as Law Reform: ALEC’s Model on 
Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
279, 280 (2015) (describing the efforts of “influential business-funded think tanks” to lobby 
state legislatures to pass laws limiting the ability of consumers to protect their rights). 
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amount of hostility it wants in its arbitration clause, and there is virtually 
nothing a consumer or employee can do about it.  The legislature, which is 
democratically accountable and supposed to represent its citizens as a 
whole, is powerless to address any aspect of arbitration that it deems 
problematic or less fair than litigation.184 
While not all carve-outs are one-sided, many carve-outs are.  
Moreover, the fact that carve-outs are used more often where one party 
lacks bargaining power reinforces that carve-outs are imposed by the 
stronger party and are not voluntarily negotiated.185  Giving legislatures 
similar authority to the parties that draft arbitration clauses can rectify this 
imbalance and will help ensure that when arbitration is used, it is used 
fairly.  Just as companies can decide that they do not want the burdens and 
expense of class arbitration, states should be able to decide that class 
actions must be allowed in court if they are going to be prohibited in 
arbitration.  Just as companies can contract for extra discovery if they are 
concerned about arbitrators making inaccurate decisions, legislatures also 
should be able to ensure that consumers have an ability to conduct 
sufficient discovery to build a case in arbitration.  When a legislature 
regulates some aspect of arbitration to try and make it fairer for all parties 
involved, that purported hostility should not be treated any differently than 
the hostility exhibited by corporate drafters of arbitration clauses. 
Of course, not all corporate hostility to arbitration necessarily is one-
sided.  A provision allowing repossession actions to proceed in court or for 
injunctive claims to proceed in court may help both parties, as both may 
benefit from additional judicial process or from a judge’s greater ability to 
award injunctive relief.  But whether corporate hostility systematically 
favors one side or the other obscures the larger point.  If a corporation can 
decide that it wants to reserve certain claims for courts because it thinks 
courts are superior to arbitrators for those claims, then there is no reason 
why legislatures should not be able to draw the same conclusion and 
determine that certain types of claims should be decided by a court rather 
than an arbitrator. 
 
 
 184  This is a problem afflicting adhesive contracts generally.  See, e.g., RADIN, supra 
note 179, at 23 (asserting that through adhesion contracts, corporations “delete rights that 
are granted through democratic processes”); see also David Horton, Mass Arbitration and 
Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 502 (2014) (arguing that “adhesive 
arbitration clauses push the boundaries of ex ante consent, eliminate ex post judicial 
oversight, and ultimately displace democratically-created rights”).  That problem is 
exacerbated in the arbitration context.  Whereas state governments can regulate the use of 
adhesion contracts, their power to regulate arbitration is much more limited thanks to the 
FAA.  
 185  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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Although current doctrine allows corporate hostility to arbitration 
while simultaneously prohibiting equivalent legislative or judicial hostility, 
that doctrine lacks salience in the world of adhesive, take-it-or-leave-it 
consumer and employment contracts.  Instead, this distinction elevates 
absolute freedom of contract over genuine concern about arbitration 
fairness.  In doing so, current doctrine merely perpetuates existing 
disparities by allowing the corporate party to carve out claims or design 
arbitration procedures that maximize its advantage while prohibiting 
government actors from taking steps to level the playing field for the 
individual on the other side of the contract.  How current doctrine 
surrounding FAA preemption could be adapted to better account for 
corporate hostility to arbitration is discussed in the next section. 
V. ACCOUNTING FOR CORPORATE HOSTILITY IN FAA PREEMPTION 
DOCTRINE 
The fact that corporations frequently express some hostility to 
arbitration in the way they draft their arbitration clauses suggests that states 
should have greater latitude to express hostility to arbitration without 
running into FAA preemption.  This section shows how corporate hostility 
to arbitration could justify re-conceptualizing FAA preemption doctrine in 
two possible ways.  First, the fact that parties believe that litigation is 
sometimes preferable to arbitration indicates that not all hostility to 
arbitration is improper or reflects an irrational bias against arbitration.  
Accordingly, not all judicial or legislative hostility to arbitration should be 
deemed to conflict with the FAA’s goals.  Rather, if the hostility seems 
justifiable, because of the differences between litigation and arbitration, 
and because of the ways that arbitration can be designed to strategically 
favor one party over the other, then it is perfectly appropriate for the state 
to regulate arbitration in the name of fairness.186 
Second, and more radically, the way that arbitration doctrine 
distinguishes between contracted-for limitations on arbitration and 
governmentally imposed limitations on arbitration suggests that FAA 
preemption should not apply to adhesion contracts at all.  The fact that 
parties can contract for whatever limitations on arbitration they wish, but 
that the state cannot impose the same limitations, indicates that the most 
fundamental aspect of arbitration is choice, rather than any particular 
procedural device.187  But adhesion contracts, by definition, are contracts 
 
 186  See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (2011). 
 187  See Stipanowich, supra note 99, at 51 (“Choice is what sets arbitration apart from 
litigation.”); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1946 (2014) (describing the prevailing view among arbitration 
scholars that the goal of the FAA was to preserve private autonomy and choice); Frankel, 
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where one party has no meaningful choice.  If the FAA is about protecting 
the parties’ ability to mutually choose the procedures they prefer, then it 
has no role to play in the world of adhesion contracts at all.  In turn, 
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts should be subject to government 
regulation in the same way as any other contract. 
A. Allowing Some Legislative and Judicial Hostility to Arbitration 
The fact that parties express hostility to arbitration by carving out 
particular claims or by importing judicialized procedures into arbitration, 
and the fact that Congress and agencies have acted similarly at the federal 
level, reveals that not all hostility to arbitration is improper.  Parties have 
legitimate reasons for thinking that arbitration is inferior to litigation, and 
scholars have recognized as much.188 
Hostility to arbitration therefore is both inevitable and legitimate.  
While current FAA doctrine pretends otherwise, there is no good reason to 
continue to perpetuate such a fiction.  If it is acceptable for corporations to 
express hostility to arbitration in their adhesion contracts with consumers 
and employees, then it should be acceptable for governmental actors to 
express hostility by regulating arbitration, either by carving out certain 
claims from arbitration, or by regulating the arbitration process to make it 
fairer or to address its deficiencies. 
This begs the question of how to distinguish legitimate hostility to 
arbitration from illegitimate hostility to arbitration.  While it may seem 
difficult at first, there are various ways to approach this. Initially, a law that 
affects arbitration should not automatically trigger “rigorous”189 scrutiny or 
inherent suspicion of that law.  It may turn out to be the case that most 
hostility to arbitration, and hence most regulation of arbitration, is 
legitimate.  Recall that the framers of the FAA were seeking to reverse a 
broad and sweeping hostility to arbitration in which courts would refuse to 
specifically enforce an arbitration clause simply because it was an 
arbitration clause—in other words, wholesale prejudice against arbitration 
writ large, without reference to whether arbitration was better or worse than 
litigation under any specific circumstances.190  There is a big difference 
between stating that arbitration clauses are always unenforceable and 
stating, for example, that arbitration clauses are unenforceable for claims 
 
supra note 39, at 250–52. 
 188  See supra Part III; Drahozal & O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1969 (stating that parties 
may choose carve-outs when “they trust courts to better protect their interests than 
arbitrators”). 
 189  Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1119–20 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating 
that the FAA enshrines “a principle of rigorous equality” between arbitration clauses and 
other contracts). 
 190  See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
FRANKEL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2019  3:57 PM 
752 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:707 
involving high stakes, or stating that arbitration clauses can be enforced, 
but that the arbitration system must allow for sufficient discovery to enable 
the plaintiff to build his or her case.  These limitations are not fully hostile 
to arbitration, but instead rest on assumptions that arbitration, in particular 
situations, may be less likely than a court to result in an accurate and 
satisfactory outcome. 
One way to approach this is by looking to the carve-outs used by 
private parties.  If private arbitration clauses carve out a particular claim or 
procedure, then that should give rise to a rebuttable presumption that a state 
regulation equivalent to the carve-out is not preempted.  For example, if 
private parties carve out injunctive claims because they think that courts are 
superior at managing injunctive claims, then states should be able to adopt 
a regulation forbidding mandatory arbitration of injunctive claims.  If they 
did so, that regulation would be presumptively legitimate, though that 
presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the state had an illegitimate 
or pretextual reason for adopting the regulation.  This would also hold true 
for other types of frequently carved-out claims, such as small claims, debt 
collection claims, anti-severability principles, and so on. 
A related framework is one that would look at the state government’s 
motivation or purpose in assessing whether a particular rule expressing 
hostility to arbitration is preempted or not.  Professor Hiro Aragaki has 
suggested applying an anti-discrimination framework that asks if 
legislation regulating arbitration is motivated by invidious discrimination 
or whether it has a legitimate justification, in the same way that anti-
discrimination law analyzes allegedly illegal behavior.191  Similarly, 
Professor David Horton argues that the FAA should only preempt state 
rules that “unjustifiably disfavor arbitration,” i.e., ones that rest on an 
inherent suspicion of arbitration rather than ones that attempt to recognize a 
specific and concrete drawback or deficiency of arbitration.192  These 
models are commendable, and deserve fuller consideration.  Looking at the 
FAA through the lens of contractual hostility to arbitration reinforces the 
view of these scholars that some hostility to arbitration is acceptable and 
bolsters the argument that states should be free to express justified hostility 
to arbitration without being subject to federal preemption. 
In determining whether a legislature has a legitimate reason for 
regulating arbitration, courts could also borrow from Commerce Clause or 
Equal Protection analysis.  In particular, state legislatures could make 
findings when adopting laws regulating arbitration, and courts could 
examine those findings as part of the preemption inquiry.  Just as courts 
 
 191  Aragaki, supra note 186, at 1263–71. 
 192  David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public 
Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1255, 1265–72 (2013). 
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can consider congressional findings in determining whether a federal law 
affects interstate commerce, courts could also look to legislative findings 
that explain the reasons for regulating arbitration in considering whether 
the law reflects an unjustified hostility to arbitration.193  And unlike current 
law, which establishes a presumption that any regulation of arbitration is 
inappropriately hostile and is preempted unless shown otherwise, accepting 
the proposition that hostility to arbitration is natural and inevitable should 
lead courts to give some deference (subject to rebuttal) to legislative 
findings indicating that the state has a legitimate reason for imposing some 
limit on the scope or process of arbitration.194  Similarly, courts could 
import an Equal Protection framework and presume that the state has a 
rational basis for regulating arbitration unless evidence shows otherwise.195 
As explained above, allowing regulation where there is justified 
hostility to arbitration is more even-handed and better levels the playing 
field between corporations and consumers.  Instead of allowing only self-
interested hostility that is used to maximize one party’s advantage relative 
to the other, allowing regulation by democratically accountable bodies can 
advance everyone’s interests. 
This view also is consistent with the Court’s statements that Congress 
enacted the FAA to place arbitration clauses “upon equal footing” with 
other contracts.  If one thinks of “equal footing” in a process-oriented way 
rather than in a substantive way, then allowing regulation of arbitration 
clauses treats them the same as other contracts.  Contract law generally is 
state law.  Thus, contracts are subject to regulation by state governments.196  
 
 193  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) (“While Congress normally 
is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on 
interstate commerce, the existence of such findings may enable us to evaluate the legislative 
judgment that the activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce, even though 
no such substantial effect is visible to the naked eye.”) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
 194  In fact, that is how courts used to analyze federal statutes under the Commerce 
Clause, before the Supreme Court changed the law in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
557 n.2 (1995).  See, e.g., Presault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (“We evaluate this claim 
under the traditional rationality standard of review: we must defer to a congressional finding 
that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce if there is any rational basis for such a 
finding[.]”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104, 1111 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (“If we find that Congress has any rational basis for finding that a regulated 
activity affects interstate commerce, our investigation is at an end.”). 
 195  See FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and 
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor 
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection 
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 
basis for the classification.”). 
 196  See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1941) (“[N]either property rights nor 
contract rights are absolute . . . .  Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the 
public to regulate it in the common interest.”). 
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Currently, while legislators can regulate most contracts in almost any way 
they wish, one type of contractual provision they cannot regulate is an 
arbitration clause.197  States often regulate contracts where they perceive a 
risk of unfairness.  States might regulate contracts in one substantive area, 
such as franchise contracts.198  Or they might regulate where they perceive 
market failures, such as where there are disparities in bargaining power 
between contracting parties.199  Allowing states to regulate arbitration 
where they perceive justifiable hostility, say to address specific 
shortcomings, or to carve out specific subject matters from arbitration 
where arbitration may be inferior to litigation, is perfectly consistent with 
how states regulate other contracts.  Making arbitration clauses impervious 
to all regulation other than general common-law rules applicable to all 
contracts is not. 
B. Adhesion and Preemption 
A more radical viewpoint is that the dissonance between permissible 
corporate hostility to arbitration expressed through contract and 
impermissible hostility expressed in state regulation indicates that the FAA 
should not limit or prohibit states from regulating arbitration clauses in 
non-negotiable adhesion contracts at all.  In other words, the FAA should 
not preempt any regulation of adhesive arbitration clauses. 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Concepcion, parties can contract 
for limitations, conditions, or restrictions on arbitration that state 
legislatures cannot impose.200  That distinction is important in thinking 
about the FAA’s purposes and objectives, because the FAA only preempts 
rules that stand as an obstacle to the performance of the statute’s purposes.  
The FAA’s purpose cannot be to enshrine any particular procedure or 
characteristic of arbitration, because as the Court indicated, parties can 
contract for almost any procedure they want, subject to a few limitations.201  
Rather, as several scholars have identified, this distinction suggests that the 
fundamental characteristic of arbitration that the FAA was concerned with 
 
 197  Securities Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[N]o state 
may simply subject arbitration to individuated regulation in the same manner as it might 
subject some other unprotected contractual device (say, a prescriptive period or exculpatory 
clause contained within a private contract).”). 
 198  See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-50-4 (2014) (regulating a franchisor’s ability to 
terminate a franchisee). 
 199  Minimum wage laws, child labor laws, or other laws regulate contractual 
employment relationships are examples of state laws that limit the rights of contracting 
parties for the purpose of protecting fairness. 
 200  AT&T, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011). 
 201  See id. 
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was choice.202  And as I have argued elsewhere, that choice means 
meaningful, freely negotiated choice exercised by both parties to the 
transaction.203 
The adhesion contracts and arbitration clauses that are present in 
consumer transactions, however, are defined by the absence of choice.  The 
only party with any control over the contract terms is the corporate party 
that drafts and imposes the arbitration clause.  This adhesion regime is 
arguably at odds with the FAA’s purpose of preserving meaningful choice.  
Several scholars have addressed how the FAA was intended for 
commercial transactions between sophisticated parties with roughly equal 
bargaining power rather than for take-it-or-leave-it business-to-consumer 
transactions.204  Moreover, the Act’s legislative history indicates that 
Congress never envisioned that the Act would apply to take-it-or-leave-it 
adhesion contracts like the ones used in employment settings.205 
If the FAA was intended to protect the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses that were the product of meaningful choice, then the Act has no 
bearing on adhesion contracts marked by the absence of choice.  
Regulation of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts therefore does not 
run afoul of the FAA and should not be preempted.  Society may now 
accept that “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other 
than adhesive are long past[,]”206 but that does not mean that it must accept 
that such contracts are beyond the reach of reasonable regulation designed 
to rectify the one-sided nature of adhesion contracts.  Treating arbitration 
clauses equally with other contracts should recognize that adhesive 
arbitration clauses, like other adhesive contracts, are characterized by a 
 
 202  See supra note 187 and accompanying text.  
 203  Frankel, supra note 39, at 251. 
 204  See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 33, 75–81 (arguing that the framers intended the FAA to be limited to commercial 
disputes between business entities); Sternlight, supra note 21, at 647 (“Most commentators 
have concluded that the FAA was envisioned as applying to consensual transactions 
between two merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, and not necessarily to 
transactions between a large merchant and a much weaker and less knowledgeable 
consumer.”). 
 205  See Sternlight, supra note 21, at 647; see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 
1612, 1642–43 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The legislative hearings and debate 
leading up to the FAA’s passage evidence Congress’ aim to enable merchants of roughly 
equal bargaining power to enter into binding agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes.”) 
(emphasis in original); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477–78 (2015) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that the FAA was intended to address arbitration of 
commercial disputes and that “Congress in 1925 could not have anticipated that the Court 
would apply the FAA to render consumer adhesion contracts invulnerable to attack by 
parties who never meaningfully agreed to arbitration in the first place”). 
 206  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346. 
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disparity in bargaining power.  And just as it is appropriate to regulate 
other contracts to correct any unfairness resulting from that disparity, it is 
perfectly appropriate for states to correct against unfairness that manifests 
in an adhesive arbitration clause.  Because adhesion contracts are outside 
the purview of what the FAA was trying to protect, states should be 
permitted to regulate arbitration clauses appearing in adhesion contracts 
without being subject to FAA preemption.  This in turn could promote free 
choice.  If courts interpret the FAA to give states greater authority to 
regulate adhesive arbitration agreements than they previously had, that may 
encourage parties that wish to use arbitration agreements to give 
contracting parties greater negotiating power over the arbitration 
provision’s terms.207 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Aided by corporate and business interests that have a strong interest in 
enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court in the last 
thirty years has greatly expanded the scope of FAA preemption on the 
ground that the Act preempts any state law expressing hostility to 
arbitration.  At the same time that corporations seek to invalidate any law 
that regulates arbitration as representing inappropriate hostility to 
arbitration, however, they frequently express their own hostility to 
arbitration by using carve-outs and other drafting techniques.  While 
corporations have the power to express hostility to arbitration when this 
approach serves their own interests, they have strategically prevented 
democratically accountable state-government institutions from expressing 
that same hostility to arbitration in the interest of protecting their citizens.  
Current preemption doctrine does not account for this dichotomy.  It 
should, and FAA preemption principles should recognize that state laws 
expressing hostility to arbitration should not necessarily be preempted, as 
many of those laws express the same hostility to arbitration that 
corporations express in their arbitration clauses. 
 
 
 207  Frankel, supra note 39, at 253. 
